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ABSTRACT

A COGNITIVE TASK VIA INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY AS ENRICHMENT FOR
CHIMPANZEES (PAN TROGLODYTES) IN SANCTUARY
by
Federico Salud Rubio
May 2019
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) hold an especially powerful attraction for
researchers interested in cognition and how it developed to the degree observed in
humans specifically and primates more generally. Chimpanzees are behaviorally complex
primates with compelling data supporting their possession of intricate internal lives. The
objective of this study was to simultaneously learn more of the cognitive process of
inductive reasoning while also assessing the efficacy of a computerized box as a novel
form of enrichment to aid in improving the environment of captive chimpanzees. Three
social groups at the retired medical research chimpanzee sanctuary Project Chimps were
given voluntary access to an interactive box inspired by previous touchscreen studies.
Individuals varied widely in their interactions with the box but did not perform above
chance on the preliminary levels of the task. Interest in the box was also observed to
correlate negatively with the number of sessions so that exploration in the final sessions
were significantly lower than that recorded in the first sessions. These results highlight
the need for refinement in provisioning captive chimpanzees with interactive technology
as enrichment.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The discussion of cognition and its degree in nonhuman animals only deepens
with each new examination into the workings of the mind. Historically, animals were
believed to be no more than biological automatons whose behavior could be attributable
to the programming of their primitive instincts (see Allen & Trestman, 2017, for a
review). The discoveries of the mechanisms of evolution and genetics contribute to the
understanding that all life on the planet is intrinsically connected to all other life and
established the context by which we can interpret the behavior and cognition of
nonhuman animals. Through this context, we have developed the view that life exists on
a continuum, and that the features we use to define ourselves as human are in fact shared
by other species, most especially by our closest living relatives, the primates. This
understanding also shapes our view on the morality of captivity and animal welfare, and
what obligations we have to the beings kept in our care.
The tribe Hominini was once a diverse clade but over time was reduced to our
own single human species, Homo sapiens. This loss of diversity left a distinct
evolutionary gap between humans and other primates, which has proven to be a great
frustration for those seeking answers to the when, why, and how humanity came to be so
distinct among animals. Because of this lack of extant hominin species, chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) have become a focal species in inter-species comparative investigations
– a direct result of their genetic proximity to our own species. Humans and chimpanzees
are famously proclaimed to share approximately 99% of the same DNA (Cohen, 2007).
This genetic similarity directly resulted in chimpanzees becoming a favored model in
1

medical and pharmaceutical research in the United States, a practice that did not officially
end until recently (Grimm, 2015). The exact degree of relatedness between ourselves and
our next of kin has been scrutinized on many occasions, and some estimates of
relatedness have suggested that our two species are not quite so genetically similar as has
been previously purported (Cohen, 2007). Bonobos (Pan paniscus) share approximately
the same degree of relatedness to humans as chimpanzees do, having diverged from
chimpanzees between two and a half million or possibly eight hundred thousand years
ago (Stone et al., 2010). However, bonobos are far less numerous than chimpanzees and,
as such, were not the preferred model for comparative research.
The debate over whether the genus Pan should be included in the tribe Hominini
has become a sensationalized issue that will not soon be resolved (Goodman et al., 1998).
In terms of comparative cognitive studies with animals in general, whether it is
worthwhile to draw comparisons between our cognition and that of another species yields
several viewpoints. Comparing the cognition of any two species that occupy different
ecological niches and face incomparable selective pressures raises concern over the
validity of those comparisons, and interspecies comparisons become even more muddled
when considering how captive environments may affect the ontogeny of cognition in
contrast to wild-born/reared counterparts (Boesch, 2007).
The defining features of humans that have traditionally been used as criteria to
elevate humanity above others of the animal kingdom (i.e., tool use, reasoning ability,
culture, language, episodic memory) are constantly redefined, expanded, or in some
instances completely eliminated as knowledge is gathered about the nature and abilities
of nonhuman animals. Culture (Whiten et al., 1999; van Leeuwen, Cronin, & Haun,
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2014), episodic memory (Taylor, 2014), language (Radick, 2007), reasoning ability
(Premack & Premack, 1994), and tool use (Limongelli, Boysen, Visalberghi, &
Snowdon, 1995; Bond, Kamil, & Balda, 2003; Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007; Vaesen, 2012;
Taylor, 2014) have all been showcased in species other than our own. As the line that
distinguishes humanity from nonhuman animals blurs, one concept becomes clear:
nonhuman primates are complex creatures with complex needs, and it is our duty as their
custodians to fulfill those needs, especially in their captive environments.
Being our closest genetic relatives alongside the bonobo, chimpanzees have been
made the subject of numerous cognitive studies examining a wide range of cognitive
functions including reasoning, working memory, and even theory of mind. A primary
objective for many of these studies is to delineate which cognitive abilities we share with
our closest living relatives and if so, to what degree. Once this objective is met, the goal
then becomes to apply these delineations to the evolutionary framework to gain a better
understanding not of what makes our species unique but how it became unique.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Facets of Intelligence
Cognition is the summation of mental processes that constitute thought, memory
and learning. Intelligence can be considered the adeptness with which these processes
occur and is derived from modular, or domain-specific, cognitive abilities (Byrne, 2000;
review: Shettleworth, 2001). These modular, domain-specific cognitive abilities can be
attributed to specific locations in the brain known as cortical areas, and specialization of
these areas is what distinguishes different types of cognitive processes (e.g., working
memory vs. muscle or procedural memory, visual vs. olfactory processing, etc.) (Bear,
Connors, & Paradiso, 2007). Because these are discrete areas of the brain and because
individual species are subjected to unique demands on their survival, there is great
diversity in the evolution and complexity of these areas among species and therefore a
great diversity in intelligence (Bear et al., 2007).
Complex behaviors are occasionally interpreted erroneously as being indicators of
higher intelligence, such as in beehive construction. When these behaviors are inflexible
and are not versatilely applied to a variety of situations, they are more likely attributable
to being specialized adaptations of evolution and not individual intelligence (Tomasello
& Call, 1997). Another potential misinterpretation of behavior occurs with associative
learning, a relatively simple cognitive mechanism by which animals form correlations
among objects or stimuli in their environments. This type of learning does not represent a
fundamental understanding of the relationship between the objects and stimuli, only the
outcomes of those relationships.
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Memory is the process by which past experiences can be recalled and is a
cognitive ability that is not restricted to one cortical area of the brain (Bear et al., 2007).
Episodic memory “receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or
events and temporal-spatial relations among these events” (Tulving, Donaldson, &
Bower, 1972, p. 385). In other words, it is the memory that allows one to recall events
from the past in contrast to muscle, or procedural, memory, which is subconscious and
related to proprioception. Episodic memory has also been referred to as mental time
travel or being able to imagine oneself in scenarios occurring in either the past or the
future.
Curiosity, or neophilia, which is most concisely defined as the seeking of new
information, is a personality trait that is ancillary to intelligence and can be advantageous
in discovering novel exploitable resources (Damerius, Graber, Willems, & van Schaik,
2017). This is the basis for innovation, which is preserved across time via social learning
between conspecifics through horizontal and vertical transmission (Ramsey, Bastian &
van Schaik, 2007; van Schaik, & Burkart, 2011). Curiosity was likely the catalyst for the
development of spear hunting of bushbabies in the chimpanzees of Fongoli (Pruetz &
Bertolani, 2007) and termite-fishing and ant-dipping in Gombe (McGrew, 1979), and as
such, may be a key prerequisite to hypotheses on the origin of intelligence such as the
social and cultural intelligence hypotheses (van Schaik, & Burkart, 2011). It has been
proposed that the underlying motivations of curiosity are to either reduce feelings of
uncertainty about new objects or to stimulate arousal because it is pleasurable (Litman,
2005). This latter hypothesis is the one of interest in terms of providing novel enrichment
to captive animals because it insinuates that novelty in and of itself is stimulating and,
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therefore, beneficial for captive welfare (Forss, Schuppli, Haiden, Zweifel, & van Schaik,
2015). Neophobia is the reverse of neophilia and is hypothesized to have developed as a
strategy to avoid possible threats, such as by discouraging ingestion of unknown foods
that could be lethal. Animals in captivity are not immune to neophobia, and this aversion
should be kept in mind in considerations of welfare as well (Gustafsson, Saint Jalme,
Bomsel, & Krief, 2014).
Transitive inference is the formation of a relationship between two entities based
on their relationships to a common factor and is presumed to have developed in social
species with linear dominance hierarchies. This type of reasoning allows individuals to
infer linear relationships between two of their conspecifics based on the individuals’
relationships with a third individual (Vasconcelos, 2008). Investigations into this
particular cognitive mechanism and evidence for its pervasiveness encompass a diverse
array of species including honey bees, pigeons, rats, platyrrhine and catarrhine monkeys,
and chimpanzees (Vasconcelos, 2008). Transitive inference ability requires some degree
of abstract thinking in that an individual that demonstrates this ability is capable of
imagining relationships based on incomplete information. This capacity to infer
relationships without explicit information was essential to the successful completion of
the cognitive task presented in this study.
Metacognition is the cognitive ability “to mentally access, evaluate, and act upon
one’s body of knowledge,” or in lay terms, the process of thinking about thinking
(Neldner, Collier-Baker, & Nielson, 2015, p. 683). This cognitive ability is one of the
more challenging abilities to quantify and measure. Designing experiments to test for
metacognition is complex and requires careful execution to ensure that positive results

6

are in fact evidence of metacognition and not a result of other more parsimonious
explanations (Marsh & MacDonald, 2012). In the context of primatology, questions of
metacognition arise in social interactions among individuals. For chimpanzees
specifically, Hare, Call, Agnetta and Tomasello (2000) demonstrated that chimpanzees
are cognizant of what their subordinate or dominant conspecifics perceive visually and
select food items based on that perceived perception. A subsequent experiment by the
same investigators modified the original experiment by providing one individual with
more knowledge of the whereabouts of the food than the other (Hare, Call, & Tomasello,
2001). The results of this study strongly suggest that chimpanzees are aware of the
knowledge their conspecifics possess and make strategic decisions utilizing this
knowledge of another’s knowledge. Further yet, another study provided evidence that
chimpanzees are capable of knowing that others make inferences about hidden food
rewards and modify their decisions based on those inferences (Schmelz, Call, &
Tomasello, 2011).
Theory of mind describes the ability to attribute mental states, such as motives
and intentions, to oneself and other individuals (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
Experiments with mouse controllers and computer screens have shown that chimpanzees
are aware of their own self-agency when moving the cursor (Kaneko & Tomonaga, 2011)
but a more difficult question to answer is whether they are able to ascribe agency and
minds to others. Gaze-following is often used as an indirect indication of theory of mind.
Individuals that follow the gaze of their conspecifics know that their conspecific is
perceiving something of interest and then attempt to take on that perspective by following
their gaze (Call, Hare, & Tomasello, 1998). This interpretation suggests that the gaze
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follower has attributed a mental state to another and, therefore, possesses a theory of
mind (Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003). Hare et al. (2000) ultimately conclude in their
subordinate/dominant visual knowledge study that chimpanzees are indeed capable of
knowing what their conspecifics do and do not see, which in turn supports the argument
for theory of mind in chimpanzees but thus far has not been demonstrated to equal that of
humans (Tomasello et al., 2003). These studies were followed by another that asserted
that although chimpanzees are aware of what others know, they do not possess the mental
faculties to understand when others hold false beliefs (Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello,
2008). This experiment was a derivation of the false belief studies with human children,
which showed that human children are not capable of understanding that another person
can hold a belief that is inconsistent with reality until around 4 years old (Wellman, Cross
& Watson, 2001). Other methods for assessing theory of mind include experiments
testing whether primates make decisions based on their knowledge of another
individual’s knowledge, which has yielded some interesting results supporting theory of
mind in apes (Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016).
The facet of intelligence of interest in the current study is the capacity for
inductive reasoning. Induction, or the ability to infer general conclusions from specific
examples, is a form of reasoning that becomes especially pertinent in foraging. Being
able to infer the location of food based on seasonality, distance, and number of
conspecifics present allows individuals to effectively allocate their time to searching for
and consuming food, as demonstrated by yellow-nosed monkeys (Cercopithecus ascanius
whitesidei) (MacDonald, Wilkie, & Gallup, 1990), cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus
oedipus) (Banerjee et al., 2009) and chimpanzees (Bonnie et al., 2012; Hopper, Kurtycz,
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Ross, Bonnie, & Vonk, 2015). The purpose of the current study was two-fold: to assess to
what degree our closest living relative shares this ability with humans, while also
providing access to novel cognitive enrichment in their captive environments.
Hypotheses on the Origin of Intelligence
A higher degree of intrinsic intelligence in humans is asserted in the general
intelligence hypothesis and has historically been cited as a key difference between our
species and others (Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011). However, it is no longer argued that
general intelligence is exclusive to humans after examinations across multiple species
and domains of intelligence (Herrmann, Call, Hernàndez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello,
2007; Banerjee et al., 2009; Reader et al., 2011; Matzel & Sauce, 2017). These studies
demonstrate that, although nonhuman animals do not possess the same facets of
intelligence to the same degree as humans, some of them do share, if not exceed, its core
rudiments in several areas (e.g., object permanence, spatial memory, reasoning, theory of
mind) that cannot be disregarded or interpreted as insignificant (Herrmann et al., 2007;
Marino et al., 2007; Banerjee et al., 2009; Taylor, 2014).
The social intelligence hypothesis postulates that the complexity inherent to social
interactions acts as a driving force for the evolution of greater intelligence and cognitive
ability (Jolly, 1966; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). Social animals face intricate interactions
with their conspecifics daily that vary based on the unique relationship with that specific
individual, and as such are under greater pressure to develop cognitive abilities that allow
them to understand and navigate these complex interactions. These cognitive abilities are
observable in the neural mechanisms and physical structures of certain brain regions
known to be associated with social interaction (Platt, Seyfarth & Cheney, 2015). How
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social intelligence might increase survival and fitness led to the creation of cooperative
task paradigms, which became a widely popular test of social intelligence in numerous
species such as Bornean orangutans (Chalmeau, Lardeux, Brandibas, & Gallo, 1997),
tufted capuchins (Chalmeau, Visalberghi, & Gallo, 1997), tufted capuchins and
chimpanzees (Visalberghi, 1997), bonobos (Hare, Melis, Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham,
2007), elephants (Elephas maximus) (Plotnik, Suphachoksahakun, & de Waal, 2011),
chimpanzees (Schneider, Melis, & Tomasello, 2012) and finally wolves and dogs (Canis
lupus & Canis lupus familiaris) (Marshall-Pescini, Schwarz, Kostelnik, Virányi, &
Range, 2017). Criticisms have arisen against the results obtained from chimpanzee
involvement in these types of studies, however, given the ecological invalidity of forcing
chimpanzees to cooperate when the social structure of the species is more conducive to
competition (Hare et al., 2001; Schmelz & Call, 2016).
Diet, specifically frugivory, is another prospective selective pressure on the
evolution of intelligence (Decasien, Williams, & Higham, 2017). High seasonality of
fruit availability forces the animals that depend on those resources to be temporally and
spatially aware of that availability (Byrne, 2000), thereby creating pressure for advanced
temporal and spatial memory, which is consistent with findings in corvids that cache their
food (Taylor, 2014). Food availability and its potential effect on intelligence emphasizes
ecological rather than social roots for evolved cognitive abilities. No one hypothesis is
likely to be the sole selective pressure for intelligence in any species when considering
the diverse ecological niches that species occupy (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). This becomes
most apparent when observing the high degree of cognitive ability in animals such as
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cephalopod molluscs, which subsist in an ecology and possess a nervous system that are
completely foreign to that of our own (Ikeda, 2009).
Animal Cognition
Investigations into animal cognition span across countless taxa, and clades that
are known for their above average cognitive ability tend to share the common factor of a
higher brain-volume-to-body ratio such as in cephalopods (Ikeda, 2009), corvids (Bond et
al., 2003; Taylor, 2014), cetaceans (Marino et al., 2007), and several primates (Byrne,
2000; Reader & Laland, 2002; Reader et al., 2011). Which volume/ratio measures of the
brain best reflect accurate predictions of higher cognitive ability and whether the ratio
itself is an appropriate indicator of these abilities are debatable topics (Byrne, 2000), but
some corvids do tend toward a high brain volume to body ratio and are known for higher
instances of tool use than any other bird group (Bond et al., 2003; Taylor, 2014). Ravens
(Corvus corax) have demonstrated the ability to recollect which experimenters will give a
more preferred food reward a month after initial trials (Müller, Massen, Bugnyar, &
Osvath, 2017). Additionally, scrub jays (Aphelocoma coerulescens) that cache food have
been shown to understand the degradation rates of different food items and visit cache
sites based on these expiration dates to maximize their usage of stored food, suggesting
an ability to form and recollect episodic-like memory (Taylor, 2014). In addition to this
capacity for recollection, jays are also capable of anticipating future food availability and
cache current food according to the degradation rates of the soon-available resources,
thus providing evidence for their possession of forethought (Taylor, 2014).
Further evidence for the exceptional cognitive abilities of corvids involved the
capture of American crows (Corvus brachyrhynchos) by experimenters wearing masks
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(Taylor, 2014). When the same crows re-encountered individuals wearing the same
masks of their capturers, they reacted aggressively, suggesting that they retained the
memory of the transgressions performed by the masked experimenters. A more
parsimonious explanation states that the crows learned through association that the masks
were linked to the threat of capture, and they reacted accordingly. Because we do not yet
possess the means to quantitatively measure thought and are incapable of providing
evidence for cognitive convergence, it is vital to avoid equating behavioral convergence
with cognitive convergence. Positive results should be interpreted cautiously (Taylor,
2014).
Despite these shortcomings, the signature-testing approach can be used to identify
explicit indicators of cognitive mechanisms via their errors, biases, and limits in an
attempt to provide empirical evidence for cognitive convergence between corvids and
other non-related taxa (Taylor, 2014). Invasive methodologies and their moral
consequences aside, behavioral examinations of cognitive mechanisms provide the best
means to contrast cognitive convergence. Standardization of these kinds of experiments
would be invaluable in comparative studies of cognition and will facilitate identification
of parallel cognitive mechanisms that were convergently evolved to satisfy the same
needs as other species of different taxa and ecologies.
Spatial Cognition
Spatial cognition relates to how an organism navigates its environment based on
its knowledge of the physical composition of that environment. This type of cognition is
used on a daily basis as it is the way in which animals are able to locate or return to
important feeding and resting sites (for review see Call, 2000; Garber & Dolins, 2014) as
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well as the means by which they predict the future position of objects in motion
(Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992). Being able to travel to feeding sites efficiently is
essential because inefficient travel that yields little or no nutrition puts more caloric strain
on the traveling animal (review: Call, 2000; Hopper et al., 2015). In one experiment of
reversal learning and spatial memory, yellow-nosed monkeys searched for food among
eight cups distributed around their enclosure, only half of which were baited (MacDonald
et al., 1990). Once the monkeys retrieved all the food rewards, the other half of cups that
had not originally contained food were baited. The monkeys were able to find the
correctly baited cups quickly and accurately in four or five selections, even after an hour
had passed between trials (MacDonald et al., 1990). Primates in the wild tend to take
straight paths along familiar travel routes to established high-yield feeding sites and some
spider monkeys (Ateles belzebuth) have been shown to choose more efficient routes than
computer simulation models would predict (Garber & Dolins, 2014).
Temporal Cognition
Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) and chimpanzees have been assessed for the
cognitive ability of forethought (Osvath & Osvath, 2008). This experiment allowed for
the testing of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis on mental time travel, which asserts that
nonhuman animals lack this ability. In this study, individuals were trained to retrieve a
liquid food reward with a straw-like tool. During the experimental trials, individuals were
given the option to select the straw-like tool from three pseudo-randomly placed
distractors to eliminate biases caused by placement of the tools. They were then allowed
to keep the tool they had selected when returning to their main enclosure area. After 70
minutes, they were brought to the testing area where the reward was kept. Subjects could
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access the reward if they both chose and retained the appropriate tool. Correct selection
was 100% in all but one trial for one of the chimpanzees. Each individual was only given
fourteen trials, as a way to minimize development of associative learning, but associative
learning does not require excessive repetition and can be established with as little as one
instance (Bernstein & Webster, 1980).
Constant rewarding via the same tool meant that associative learning could be the
likely explanation for success in this study. This process of a reward reinforcing a
behavior is known as operant conditioning, and is the same method used in positive
reinforcement training to promote desired behaviors (Pomerantz & Terkel, 2009). In
order to rule out operant conditioning and associative learning as potential explanations
for the results observed in this experiment, the paradigm could have been modified to
tease apart what features of the straw-like tool the subjects chose that tool for. Removing
the first straw-like tool and replacing it with one that accomplished the same goal would
provide support for the orangutans and chimpanzees comprehending the nature of the
problem and its correct solution. Despite uncertainty in the cognitive ability of the
individual subjects, “the lack of observable hesitation in the tool use was striking and
would suggest a high fidelity in the envisioning of the function and the necessary
manipulations” (Osvath & Osvath, 2008, p. 671).
Tool-Use
Tool-use tasks are a commonly used method to gauge the mental capabilities of
nonhuman animals. Wolfgang Köhler’s 1925 experiments with chimpanzees were among
the first explorations into the cognitive ability of apes with tools (as cited by Tomasello
& Call, 1997). In one set of experiments, a chimpanzee was given interlocking sticks that
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when connected allowed the chimpanzee to reach distant food through a fence. The
chimpanzee initially attempted to reach the bananas with only half of the connecting
sticks to no avail. Upon manipulation of the sticks and realizing that they could be
connected, the individual immediately realized the value of the length of the newly
fashioned tool and returned to the fence to retrieve the banana. In a subsequent set of
experiments by Köhler in 1926, bananas were suspended out of immediate reach of the
chimpanzees, and in order to reach them, individuals had to stack several boxes on top of
each other and then climb the makeshift tower to acquire the food. Through these
experiments, Köhler hoped to find evidence for insight learning in chimpanzees, or the
ability to solve a problem without stumbling upon a solution by trial and error (Ash, Jee,
& Wiley, 2012). Köhler’s chimpanzees were eventually successful in both tasks, but
critics argued that the interlocking of sticks and stacking of boxes by the chimpanzees
may have been learned techniques from previous experiences and, therefore, did not
provide evidence for insight learning.
One study of tool use involved the use of a trap tube in which chimpanzees could
only retrieve a food reward if they pushed it away from the hole in which it would then
be irretrievable with a stick (Limongelli et al., 1995). This same paradigm was initially
used to test tufted capuchins (Cebus apella), but it was ultimately concluded that the
capuchins did not have a comprehension of what constituted a successful solution
(Visalberghi, Limongelli, & Gallup, 1994). The transparency of the tube and trap meant
that the chimpanzees had the opportunity to evaluate the puzzle before attempting to
retrieve the reward. An immediate understanding of the solution was referred to as “a
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priori representational strategy” (homologous to Köhler’s insight learning) and trial-anderror attempts as “ongoing action anticipatory strategy” (Limongelli et al., 1995).
Performance between chimpanzees varied greatly, with some showing no clear
grasp of the properties of the apparatus and others demonstrating a strong comprehension
of what led to successful acquisition of the food reward. One individual held their hand
under the opposite side of where they pushed the food reward, demonstrating their
anticipation of the food reward falling out, but did not fully grasp the nature of the
apparatus and, therefore, left several trials empty-handed. Orangutans were given a
similar task in an examination of curiosity and its relationship with problem-solving
ability but were less successful at this task compared to the other tasks (Damerius et al.,
2017). Ultimately, these studies substantiate that the primates tested did not understand
the task sufficiently enough to form a mental representation of the problem and were
incapable of solving the task quickly and consistently through that representation.
Forming a mental representation of the task in the current study was critical to consistent
successful completion as well.
Broad Assessments
The Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) (Tomasello & Call, 1997) created a
standardized assessment of cognitive ability across multiple species. In one execution of
the battery 105 human children, 106 chimpanzees, and 32 Bornean orangutans (Pongo
pygmaeus) were tested by Herrmann et al. (2007). The battery is divided into physical
and social categories. The physical domain of the test battery scores subjects’
comprehension of spatial displacements, quantity discrimination ability, and
understanding of causal relations between objects. Examples include object permanence,
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or recognizing continuity of existence even when an item is out of view, as well as
transposition, the ability to track an object as it changes location. Tool use causality was
examined as well and is defined as adeptness at using tools to achieve goals, which
necessitates a comprehension of cause and effect to do so. The social domain assessment
tests the ability to learn socially (i.e., imitation, or the process of observing a behavior by
a conspecific and adopting that behavior), understanding of communicative cues, and
searches for evidence of theory of mind by gaze following.
Human children outperformed chimpanzees in terms of object permanence,
whereas chimpanzees were better than children at object transposition (Hermann et al.,
2007). All three species were adept at recognizing larger quantities but chimpanzees were
more skillful at combining quantities. Children performed better than chimpanzees or
orangutans in three of the causality tests, but chimpanzees were better than human
children and orangutans at tool use causality. Human children outperformed both ape
species in the social domain overall, with social learning being their area of greatest
proficiency. These results provide strong evidence for the cultural intelligence
hypothesis, an extension of the social intelligence hypothesis, which claims that human
hyper-sociality created even greater selective pressure for intelligence (Herrmann et al.,
2007). These results do not support the general intelligence hypothesis. Were this the
case, human participants should have outperformed the other two ape species across all
domains. However, it can be argued that the young age (around 2.5 years old) of the
subjects was an important factor in the results obtained. Many cortical areas are not yet
fully developed in children (Bear et al., 2007), and therefore children are not a valid
sample to compare against the performance of adult organisms. Once again, the validity
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of interspecies cognitive comparative studies is dubious, and the expectation of primates
to operate at the same tier as human children is reminiscent of a scala naturae
interpretation of life. Support for general intelligence as a shared ancestral primate
characteristic has been demonstrated in the cognitive ability of cotton top tamarins, which
is particularly interesting because they reside in a relatively distant cladistic branch in
relation to apes (Banerjee et al., 2009).
Two cercopithecine monkeys, olive baboons (Papio anubis) and long-tailed
macaques (Macaca fascicularis), were also given the PCTB to assess the hypothesis that
intelligence and brain size are positively correlated (Schmitt, Pankau, & Fischer, 2012).
Both species demonstrated skill in the physical domain, particularly in quantity
discrimination. Neither species generated significant results in social learning, but they
were still adept at reading communicative cues. Compared to previous studies (Herrmann
et al., 2007), the long-tailed macaques outperformed both chimpanzees and orangutans
and the olive baboons outperformed orangutans in gaze following. According to the
authors, these results do not necessarily indicate that cercopithecine monkeys
demonstrate more evidence for theory of mind than chimpanzees and orangutans; rather,
subject apathy in the chimpanzee and orangutan participants may have occurred (Schmitt
et al., 2012). Another issue with gaze following is whether it is indicative of theory of
mind or is merely an associative behavior or orientation reflex. Additionally, differences
in gaze following could be explained by differences in socio-ecology rather than
phylogeny (Schmitt et al., 2012). Overall, there were no clear distinctions between the
monkey and ape responses. The lack of interspecies differences suggest that the tests may
not be refined enough to discern subtle differences in cognitive ability (Premack &
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Woodruff, 1978; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Schmitt et al., 2012) but the alternative
remains that each of these species genuinely do not differ greatly across these domains.
Nonmatch-to-Sample
In psychology, the nonmatch-to-sample (NMS) paradigm is a well-studied
experimental design in which a subject must acquire a reward by picking a response that
does not match the initial sample or location, and so the selection of novelty is what
constitutes a correct response. Most NMS studies are conducted with delays between
initial sample exposure and selection in order to test memory, such as in aging rats
(Chrobak, Hanin, Lorens, Napier, & Squire, 1995). Performance in NMS can vary greatly
between subjects and is considered to be cognitively demanding given that subjects must
select responses that are unlike their sample cues (Elliott, Norris, Ettlinger, & Mishkin,
1977; Falcone et al., 2013). This necessitates the cognitive ability to abstractly categorize
two objects as being similar or dissimilar to each other, a fundamental prerequisite for
success in the task administered in the current study.
Oddity
Making distinctions and recognizing oddity or identifying objects that do not
match the other objects in a set is crucial because it can mean the difference between a
nutritious meal and a lethal mistake when selecting foods for consumption in wild
contexts. Identifying oddity is intertwined with inductive reasoning in that it involves
recognizing patterns and objects that do not fit those patterns, as well as making
inferences about the objects that do not adhere to those patterns. Oddity recognition
studies have been conducted in chimpanzees using human eye gaze direction (Tomonaga,
Imura, & Emery, 2010). In primates, prolonged eye contact can incite agonistic behavior,
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or combative social interactions, in certain contexts and it is for this reason that many
primates are hypothesized to have darkened sclera surrounding the iris of the eye, to
obscure the individual’s gaze direction and mitigate unintended aggression (Kobayashi &
Kohshima, 2001). This is in contrast to the non-pigmented sclera of humans. An analysis
of gaze following in apes and human infants provides support for the cooperative eye
hypothesis, in which it is proposed that the white sclera of the human eye allows easier
gaze following to improve joint attentional interactions and cooperation (Tomasello,
Hare, Lehmann, & Call 2007). Which aspects of the face are crucial in gaze
discrimination have been evaluated using both simple (e.g., visual-search methods and
polarity experiments) and advanced methods (e.g., eye-tracking technology) (Tomonaga
et al., 2010). In their experiments that manipulated the orientation, gaze direction and
color polarity of photographs of human faces, Tomonaga et al. (2010) found indications
that chimpanzees are more adept at identifying direct gazes than averted gazes. In the
context of the current study, being able to identify oddity would allow individuals to
succeed in six out of the seven levels of the task if they were able to form a generalized
mental representation.
Analogical Reasoning
Analogical reasoning studies offer an enlightening area of nonhuman primate
cognitive exploration. Another form of inductive reasoning, analogical reasoning studies
offer the opportunity to gauge whether animals understand the abstract relationships
between objects. Gillan, Premack, and Woodruff (1981) tested the chimpanzee Sarah for
this ability in a series of experiments. Trials were separated into analogy completion, in
which Sarah would choose from several options to form an appropriate analogy based on
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an example analogy, and analogy identification, in which she was to select the
comparable pair to her example analogy from several dyads of symbols. Sarah achieved
significant success in each experiment, which gave the researchers cause to believe that at
least some chimpanzees are capable of understanding some forms of analogical
reasoning. The encultured life history of Sarah was likely a key factor in her success,
since she had spent a significant amount of time performing cognitive tasks with humans
prior to this specific study (Gillan et al., 1981).
Four Guinea baboons (Papio papio) were given similar analogical matching-tosample tasks through computerized touchscreens (Fagot & Maugard, 2013). The baboons
were to match responses to the sample based on its shape, color, both shape and color, or
neither in probe trials. The samples were generated from six colors and six shapes, and
correct responses by the baboons yielded a piece of dry wheat as a reward. An 80%
success stipulation over one hundred trials in two consecutive blocks was required of the
baboons in order for them to progress to subsequent trials, and as a result, training
averaged 58,541 trials per individual over five to six weeks. On average, individuals were
77% correct. In the next experiment, ten blocks of 128 randomized trials composed of
training and probe trials were used. The baboons were 63.4% correct for probe trials. The
rate of success can be interpreted to be the consequence of the extremely high quantity of
training that the baboons received, although the authors maintain that the data provide
evidence for the ability to match relationships across different domains.
Human, chimpanzee, and rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta) subjects were tested
via relational match-to-sample tasks to create a frame of reference for aptitude in
analogical reasoning among different primate taxa (Flemming et al., 2008). Each subject
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was tasked with matching an analogical response consisting of a pair of items that
matched the relationship of the items in the sample given. The human participants were
tested using meaningful and non-meaningful words, the four chimpanzees were tested
using known and unknown lexigrams, and the five macaques were tested with Arabic
numerals. Human success surpassed both chimpanzee and rhesus macaque performances.
Chimpanzees varied in their individual ability to select the correct analogies, and the
macaques did not achieve success that could not be explained by chance. The
chimpanzees involved in the study did not match the success observed in a similar study
with the chimpanzee Sarah (Gillan et al., 1981), again possibly as a result of her uniquely
encultured life history, but it was also postulated that another critical variation between
the chimpanzees tested and Sarah was that Sarah had been trained with and utilized a
token that she used specifically to identify objects as same or different (Flemming et al.,
2008). This further illuminates the standardization issue that makes comparative data
interpretation difficult, as several variables may not be held constant and have
confounding effects, leaving room for misinterpretation. Similar to the other experiments
referenced, this specific task exemplified how critical a mental representation of an
abstract principle was for success.
Transitive Inference
Transitive inference between two corvids (pinyon jay, Gymnorhinus
cyanocephalus; western scrub jay, Aphelocoma californica) was examined to search for
the potential connection between sociality and intelligence (Bond et al., 2003). Both
species are distinct in their sociality, with pinyon jays living in groups ranging from 50 to
500 individuals and scrub jays restricted to pair-living. The transitive inference paradigm
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was tailored for easy interaction for the jays and entailed the use of different colored
lights coupled with pecking keys that the jays could make a selection with. Each light
was associated with a certain amount of food reward, and both species learned the
relationship A < B at comparable rates, but subsequent reward dyads were learned more
quickly by the pinyon jays. The reward dyads in the linear hierarchy were intermixed so
that the subjects were required to simultaneously track six dyadic relationships. Accuracy
on the task was comparable between the two species, but pinyon jays continued to
improve more rapidly than the scrub jays. Scrub jay subjects were supplemented with 100
extra training trials in an attempt to induce higher performance, but still reached an
asymptotic level of performance despite these attempts (Bond et al., 2003).
The subjects were then tested on their selection in non-adjacent pairs. Both
species demonstrated significantly high levels of accuracy, and no significant difference
was observed between the species. Notably, each pinyon jay responded correctly with at
least 70% accuracy across all pairs. Accuracy and latency differences between the two
species are believed to have been the consequence of different representational strategies
used by the two species (Bond et al., 2003). Both species were successful, but the more
social species had a higher tendency to quickly grasp the parameters of the experiment,
thus lending support to the social intelligence hypothesis.
Transitive inference studies in three juvenile chimpanzees possibly shed some
light onto the ontogeny of transitive inference for their species (Gillan, 1981). In these
trials, food rewards were placed in several differently colored containers, and the
chimpanzees were trained until they consistently chose the larger amounts. Food rewards
increased in amount across the six containers, which were labeled A through F. If
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chimpanzees are capable of transitive inference, we would expect them to choose the
greater food reward containers in non-adjacent pairs (i.e., choosing the fourth container,
D, over the second container, B). Only one of the chimpanzees chose D in the B-D
pairing in 100% of trials. An explanation of this success was that the chimpanzee chose D
over B not because of transitive inference ability, but rather because of the more recent
reward association with D. During training, container D was not only more recently
learned than B but had also yielded a larger amount.
This association interpretation was further bolstered when, in another round of
experiments, the values of the colored containers were shifted so that container A became
the highest value and container F the lowest. In this condition, the initially successful
chimpanzee’s performance suffered when selecting between non-adjacent pairs,
suggesting that she had relied on an association formed early in the initial trials.
However, success in the first trials implied that the subject had formed a mental linear
representation of the value of each container because she was never presented with all six
containers at once and had still managed to recognize the increasing value of each
successive container. Learning ability was clearly demonstrated, but re-learning ability
was not. A potential source of variation in task performance was the age and rearing
history of the chimpanzees (Gillan, 1981). Being juveniles, the cortical areas responsible
for transitive reasoning may not yet have been fully developed, which is supported by the
fact that the two unsuccessful chimpanzees were the youngest of the trio. However, nonnaturalistic life histories of the individuals in a captive setting in conjunction with
inexperience may have affected the development of certain cognitive abilities and
produced results that would not be observed in chimpanzees from wild populations.
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Whether sociality, and accordingly the social intelligence hypothesis, had any
bearing on transitive inference ability was tested in two lemur species: group-living ringtailed lemurs (Lemur catta) and the less gregarious mongoose lemur (Eulemur mongoz)
(MacLean, Merritt, & Brannon, 2008). Both species were tested on transitive inference
through a touchscreen computer monitor to evaluate the assumption that the more social
ring-tailed lemurs would be more proficient at the task as predicted by the social
intelligence hypothesis. MacLean et al. (2008) found that the ring-tailed lemurs were
more proficient at the task than the mongoose lemurs but, ultimately, the two lemur
species did not differ fundamentally in transitive inference ability because mongoose
lemurs improved their responses when cues were ordinal. Differences in spatial cognition
between the species may be the result of distinct adaptive niches. However, ring-tailed
and mongoose lemurs utilize their environments similarly and are therefore not likely to
have significant differences in spatial cognition. Performance variability in these two
species was ultimately attributed to differences in social structure rather than ecology or
training performance (MacLean et al., 2008). Kittler, Schnoell, and Fichtel (2015)
provided a review of cognitive studies of ring-tailed lemurs in comparison to other lemur
species and concluded that, although each species performed comparably in each task, the
social aspect of ring-tailed lemurs adds a level of cognitive complexity that is best
represented by their communicative cues with their group mates.
Reasoning by Exclusion
Assessments for inductive reasoning led to a paradigm that would later become a
standardized method. Human children and chimpanzee subjects watched two opaque
cups be baited with two different foods (Premack & Premack, 1994). Following a two-
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minute delay, subjects observed an experimenter eating one of the two previously hidden
food items. Subjects were then prompted to choose one of the cups and, if they inferred
correctly based on their observations of what the experimenter had been eating, they
should choose the cup that contained the food that did not match what the experimenter
had been eating because it was not being eaten by the experimenter and should therefore
still be hidden. This same paradigm has been modified to test species such as dogs
(Erdőhegyi, Topál, Virányi, & Miklósi, 2007), Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides)
(Jelbert, Taylor, Gray, & Call, 2015), apes and spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi) (Hill,
Collier-Baker, Suddendorf, & Burghardt, 2011), human children (Hill, Collier-Baker,
Suddendorf, & Call, 2012), as well as between goats and sheep (Capra aegagrus hircus
and Ovis orientalis aries) (Nawroth, von Borell, & Langbein, 2014). Of the 20 human
children tested, 18 chose the container opposite of what the trainer had chosen (Premack
& Premack, 1994). The chimpanzees varied greatly in their selections. One chimpanzee
chose the reward cup (still baited) in 100% of trials, whereas another chimpanzee chose
the non-rewarded cup (no longer baited) in 100% of trials. Another chimpanzee did not
begin to consistently select the rewarded cup until after the first two trials, and the other
until after four trials.
In the final test of this experiment, the experimenter ate an item that was identical
to one of the bait foods but was wrapped and therefore distinct from the food item that
was hidden under one of the cups (Premack & Premack, 1994). In this condition, the
older 4-year-old children picked either of the baited cups at chance levels, indicating that
they comprehended that the experimenter was eating food that could not have been the
same food they watched be hidden. However, 3-year-old children and the chimpanzees
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continued to make their selections on the assumption that a food item had been removed
from one of the cups and continued to select cups that held the food item different from
what the experimenter was eating.
An expansion on this original study considered age and species effects on
inferential reasoning and suggested that the chimpanzees previously tested may have
made their selections by association and automatically chose the opposite of what the
experimenter was eating as opposed to fundamentally understanding the experiment
(Call, 2006). Each nonhuman great ape species was represented in this updated study
(Bornean orangutans; chimpanzees; gorillas, Gorilla gorilla; bonobos). Subjects varied in
their success rates, and in the third experiment, subjects with poor memory retention and
success were excluded. Conditions with plastic chip rewards in place of food were linked
to poor performance, likely due to the absence of a food motivator. After analyzing the
results across the conditions, the author concluded that subjects were not learning by
association, that the ability to make inferences appeared to increase with age, and that
there was no apparent evidence of species differences in inferential ability (Call, 2006).
This reasoning by exclusion paradigm (Call, 2006; Premack & Premack, 1994)
has also been used to test the inferential ability of grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) in
which exclusion was defined as “the ability to base a decision on the elimination of
potential alternatives” (Pepperberg et al., 2013, p. 272). Process of elimination is the core
of induction, and an exclusion study also creates a corollary object permanence
experiment because the subjects make decisions based on their belief of whether a food
reward remains after observing an experimenter with one of the rewards (Pepperberg et
al., 2013). One hundred percent of the grey parrots (n = 4) were immediately successful

27

in the baseline visible removal of food rewards, with 50% being completely successful in
the invisible condition when the food reward was removed out of their sight, and the
remaining 50% were successful in most trials.
Conditions and sides in which food rewards were placed were randomized to
prevent inadvertent cueing. The errors committed by the subjects were interesting
because they occurred after a series of successful selections. It is possible the parrots
were engaging in exploratory behavior to discern whether the food reward had really
been removed from the cup (Pepperberg et al., 2013). There are inherent obstacles in
comparing the ability of distantly and even closely related species given the number of
variables that cannot be controlled for such as differing ecologies or perceptive ability
(Pepperberg et al., 2013). This is an especially relevant concern given the vast
evolutionary distance between psittacine birds and primates but, nevertheless, cross-taxa
comparisons of reasoning ability offer insight into the convergence of these skills.
The results obtained in the inference by exclusion paradigm have led researchers
to investigate the specific aspects of the paradigm that lead to successful responses.
Differences in perception were tested between domesticated dogs, bonobos, and
chimpanzees (Bräuer et al., 2006). Dogs are known for their comprehension of human
gestural pointing, in direct contrast to chimpanzees, bonobos, and wolves (Bräuer et al.,
2006). The social conditions of the experiments involved the use of communicative cues,
which could either be a brief point, a sustained point until a selection was made, a brief
look, or a sustained look until selection of a container. A behavioral cue was another
signal in which the subject watched the experimenter attempt to reach for and open the
correct container. Causal cues were ones involving physical properties of the containers.
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The auditory causality condition constituted the shaking of the containers by the
experimenter when it was baited or empty. Another condition was the shaking of the cup
via string, or even the production of an artificial sound in the cup to control for noise. The
visual causality conditions replaced the baiting containers with boards that would be
displaced if on top of a food reward. In one condition, the boards were baited in front of
the subject, and in another they were baited before the subjects arrived. In the control for
smell, both boards were displaced but only one was baited.
The dogs performed significantly better in the social cue conditions, whereas the
apes were better at the causal conditions (Bäuer et al., 2006). Together these findings
support the social-dog/causal-ape hypothesis, which highlights the evolutionary histories
of the two species. Dogs were bred to be cooperative companions of humans and are,
therefore, sensitive to the communicative cues of humans. Interestingly, human-reared
wolves have demonstrated this sensitivity to human communication as well (Heberlein,
Turner, Range, & Virányi, 2016). In contrast, apes, albeit social, have had less selective
pressure for symbolic communication with their conspecifics and are, therefore, more
dependent on other communicative cues to meet their basic needs for survival (Bäuer et
al., 2006). Evolution is frugal and does not result in adaptations, physical or otherwise,
that are not essential for survival in the ecological niches of the species tested, and as
such, this study also emphasizes the importance of ecological context when interpreting
results of failure or success in cognitive tasks.
Animal Welfare
One purpose of the current study was to improve the conditions of captivity for
chimpanzees that were retired from invasive biomedical research. Although sanctuaries
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do their utmost to make captivity as comfortable and stimulating as possible, the animals
in their care are undeniably deprived of the liberties and associated benefits experienced
by living in complex wild environments. For chimpanzees that have spent extensive
lengths of time in captivity, the possibility of reintroduction into wild populations is not
an option. These individuals, although more than likely capable of sustaining themselves
on wild forage with the proper training, would represent a threat to local human
populations surrounding reintroduction sites because of their habituation to human
presence and therefore higher likelihood of interaction (Hockings, Yamakoshi,
Kabasawa, & Matsuzawa, 2010). To compound the infeasibility of reintroduction,
widespread habitat destruction throughout Africa means that populations already residing
there will face increasing density challenges as the habitats dwindle (Lee, 2010). To
reintroduce more individuals would in effect compromise the quality of life for all
chimpanzees living in the area (Hernández‐Pacheco, et al., 2013; Allgas, et al., 2017).
Additionally, biomedical research chimpanzees represent a biohazard as a result of their
exposure to pathogens in laboratory settings and could jeopardize the health of wild
populations and the human communities in their vicinity. They are sometimes
specifically isolated when released in wild areas because of this risk (Pacelle, 2016).
With all these limitations to bear, captivity is the only option for these individuals and as
such it is our responsibility as their stewards to ensure that their environment is as
stimulating and enriched as possible.
Improving the conditions in which animals are kept has become a top priority in
captive institutions in the last several decades (Bloomsmith, Brent, & Schapiro, 1991;
Broom, 1991). Historically, animal enclosures in zoological parks were little more than
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barren cages. Creating enclosures that reflected the habitats in which the animals are
naturally found was the first step toward welfare-centric captivity (Carenzi & Verga,
2009). Enclosure size and design have shown to be influential on the behavior of the
animal occupants of that area, highlighting the necessity for a higher degree of
conscientiousness in housing animals when optimal welfare is the goal (Neal Webb, Hau,
& Schapiro, 2018). To achieve optimal welfare, programs should be consistently
monitored so that behavioral changes, whether good or bad, can be catalogued and their
root causes identified. In this regard, surveys of captive primate facilities are invaluable
in that they showcase what practices are commonplace and which can be improved upon
(Baker, 2016). Optimal welfare can be compromised either by the presence of aversive
stimuli or the lack of stimuli that would be encountered by the animal in a natural setting
(Morgan & Tromborg, 2007) and can even be affected by such trivialities as the
predictability of husbandry schedules throughout the course of the day (Bassett &
Buchanan-Smith, 2007).
Positive reinforcement training (PRT) is a method in which associative learning is
utilized to communicate to animals when they perform a desired behavior by providing a
reward. The potential benefits of PRT include improved caretaker/chimpanzee relations,
increased prosocial behavior, decreased abnormal behavior, decreased stress during
medical procedures, reduced shifting time between enclosures, decreased agonism during
feedings, and even increased reproductive behaviors (Pomerantz & Terkel, 2009).
Pomerantz and Terkel (2009) were interested in the implementation of PRT and whether
its use helped mitigate anxiety in 12 captive chimpanzees.
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PRT reduced rates of abnormal behavior, and its use had an overall positive net
effect, but its effectiveness varied between individuals (Pomerantz & Terkel, 2009).
Three of the chimpanzees showed a nearly 5% decrease in the frequency of stress-related
behavior (i.e. 15% pre-training, 10.2% with training). However, the dominant male
showed a 55.2% increase in stress-related behavior. Prosocial behaviors generally
increased across the group after PRT, with the exceptions of the alpha male and the oldest
individual, potentially because of neophobia in these two specific chimpanzees
(Pomerantz & Terkel, 2009). These results reiterate that universal solutions to improve
welfare are a fantasy because individual variation means that uniform reactions to
enrichment and training methods is unattainable. As such, enrichment must be
customized not only to species but to the individual as well to achieve maximum welfare.
Despite the lack of universal benefits from the use of PRT, it still offers a useful
technique by which individuals can become acquainted with novel forms of enrichment
with which they are otherwise reluctant to interact.
Enrichment is the addition of objects and activities to a captive animal’s restricted
environment to promote its expression of natural behaviors (Broom, 1991). Enrichment
can be classified into five non-mutually exclusive categories of social, physical,
nutritional, occupational, and sensory (Bloomsmith et al., 1991). Social enrichment
includes the interaction of individuals with other individuals that are typically of the same
species. Physical enrichment can be achieved in the construction of an animal’s
enclosure, such as designing ample room and substrate for climbing and brachiation
when housing primarily arboreal primates. Nutritional enrichment involves the use of
food and is typically presented in the form of extractive foraging which usually entails
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the animal using some degree of skill to acquire the food (e.g., simulated termite mound
fishing in chimpanzees). Occupational enrichment is any enrichment that engages the
animal in constant activity and is also well-represented by extractive foraging. Successful
sensory enrichment can be created by providing perceptually stimulating items in the
enclosure, such as mirrors or video recordings (Bloomsmith & Lambeth, 2000).
The ultimate goal of enrichment is to provide adequate stimulation in the
restricted environment of captivity, thereby mitigating any adverse psychological or
behavioral consequences that can develop as a result from the deprivation of that
stimulation. Abnormal behaviors (e.g., stereotypical behavior, self-injurious behavior,
regurgitation and re-ingestion, etc.) are well-documented in captive animals and are
distinct from normal behaviors by their frequency and prevalence in captive animals in
contrast to wild populations of the same species (Birkett & Newton-Fisher, 2011; Broom,
1991; Hook et al., 2002; Lopresti-Goodman, Bezner, & Ritter, 2015; Walsh, Bramblett,
& Alford, 1982). Greater frequencies of abnormal behavior in captive versus wild
populations highlights the need for environmental enrichment that arouses captive
animals into performing more species-typical behavior and, thereby, increases their wellbeing (Broom, 1991).
What behaviors can be accurately classified as abnormal has proven to be a
contentious topic. Initial ethograms of abnormal chimpanzee behaviors included such
actions as coprophagy, fecal smearing, and stereotypic movements (Walsh et al., 1982).
Arguments have been made against the default consideration of stereotypical behaviors
and coprophagy as absolute indicators of compromised welfare (Mason & Latham, 2004;
Hopper, Freeman, & Ross, 2016) because their classification as such may be
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symptomatic of an anthropocentric view of what constitutes appropriate normal behavior
for other species. The argument against such classification being that behaviors that are
unpalatable to our own species should not by default be considered inappropriate for that
reason alone.
The frequency of abnormal behaviors varies between populations of captive
animals, suggesting a social transmission component in the expression of abnormal
behaviors, and has been found to correlate directly with environmental differences in
housing (Hook et al., 2002). Jacobson, Ross, and Bloomsmith (2016) recently conducted
an evaluation of the rates of abnormal behaviors in captive chimpanzees across 26 zoos.
Their results showed that female chimpanzees were 3.57 times more likely to engage in
coprophagy than males, which is consistent with other rates of socially learned behaviors
that female chimpanzees acquire from their mothers (Hopper et al., 2016). These results
further support the claim that coprophagy can more appropriately be classified as a
socially learned, culturally-transmitted behavior. The overall rate of coprophagy in
chimpanzees born in laboratories was 5.33 times higher compared to those born in the
wild (Jacobsen et al., 2016). This higher rate can be explained by the increased
opportunity that captive chimpanzees have to participate in coprophagy compared to their
wild counterparts; captive chimpanzees occupy a limited space that naturally leads to a
greater density of feces than wild chimpanzees encounter. Behaviors that result in selfinflicted physical harm, such as self-biting, self-hitting, and hair plucking, are
unambiguous abnormal behaviors that signal poor mental and physical welfare (LoprestiGoodman et al., 2015). Optimal welfare is achieved not only through the decrease of selfinjurious behaviors but also through the promotion of species-typical behaviors (Bennett,
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et al., 2014; Bennett, Perkins, Tenpas, Reinebach, & Pierre, 2016). For chimpanzees, this
can entail the provision of enrichment that encourages foraging over wide areas and
presenting food puzzles that require tools and extraction skills to acquire the rewards.
A survey of laboratory facilities was conducted inquiring into the behavioral
management and environmental enhancement implementation of each facility (Baker,
Weed, Crockett, & Bloomsmith, 2007). According to the survey data, only 20% of
facilities changed their enrichment programs based on internal review decisions, whereas
another 65% of facilities reported changes as a result of external site visits (Baker et al.,
2007). Awareness of the effectiveness of enrichment is crucial. Providing enrichment that
does not engage the animals to which it is given does not improve welfare and,
consequently, leads to higher costs through wasted resources and labor (Bennett et al.,
2014; Bennett et al., 2016). An assessment tool for primate environmental enrichment
was created by Dutton, Pierre, Bailoo, Warkins, Michel, and Bennett (2018) in which
they assigned weighted scores to commonly utilized enrichment devices to identify the
most effective types of enrichment based on duration of engagement, agency in
engagement, and potential for interaction. According to the adjusted scores, computerbased devices, puzzles, foraging substrates and foraging objects were ranked as the most
effective enrichment (Dutton et al., 2018).
Novel enrichment and its benefits for the behavior of bonobos specifically was
recorded in a study that compared the baseline behavior of eight bonobos and their
current enrichment items with their behaviors during the implementation of five new
types of enrichment (Csatádi, Leus, & Pereboom, 2008). These bonobos were known to
experience higher social stress during the winter when confined to an indoor area and had
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a history of rough handling of infants that had resulted in an infant’s death. Each of the
five new types of enrichment were food-baited and led to increased group activity as well
as decreased infant separation from its mother (Csatádi et al., 2008). This study provided
support for the hypothesis that enrichment should be novel and varied so that the animals
do not become habituated to the enrichment and lose interest, effectively negating the
purpose of the enrichment.
The advantages of different modes of enrichment, their effects on activity
budgets, and the possibility of curbing the rate of habituation were evaluated in ten Javan
gibbons (Hylobates moloch) (Gronqvist, Kingston-Jones, May, & Lehmann, 2013).
Novel objects, olfactory enrichment, and food-based foraging equipment were left for
five days each in the gibbons’ enclosure. The gibbons were most interested in the
foraging box and the novel object boomer balls but were least interested in the scented
mat enrichments. Singing rates, a prosocial behavior, were significantly increased when
the gibbons had access to the foraging box and boomer balls. No significant interest was
observed with the use of the scented mats or boomer balls however, demonstrating that
novelty alone is insufficient to be effective enrichment and, as such, it is necessary to
tailor enrichment to species-specific interests and needs (Gronqvist et al., 2013).
Cognitive research tasks and their potential corollary benefits as enrichment has
been subject to skepticism, but “the link between cognitive research and captive care is
not only complimentary but essential to the advancement of both fields” (Ross, 2010, p.
309). Clark (2011) provides a thorough review of past cognitive studies and their
influence on the enhancement of welfare of captive great apes. In a subsequent study with
a cognitive puzzle challenge, Clark and Smith (2013) found evidence of behavioral
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benefits for adult chimpanzees in the form of increased play behavior. Successful
enrichment replicates or replaces the daily challenges of the wild counterparts of captive
animals. Because wild counterparts are subjected to challenges that are solvable by
naturally selected cognitive skills, not providing such challenges to captive animals can
be considered tantamount to deprivation of adequate stimulation. Proper balance of
challenge and solvability is a precarious task and a challenge in and of itself, in that
“tasks that are unchallenging cause boredom or apathy, while those that are challenging
cause anxiety if the individual does not have the skills required to complete the task”
(Meehan & Mench, 2007, p. 251). When providing access to these tasks, maintaining
agency of the study animal is paramount to preserve welfare because subjecting
individuals to tasks that they are both apathetic toward and incapable of succeeding in
can lead to frustration and consequently reduce welfare (Broom, 1991).
As mentioned previously, these tasks at times can prove to be sufficiently difficult
as to elicit frustration and stress. Self-directed behaviors (SDB) are considered to be
indicative of both arousal and stress in multiple primate species (Baker & Aureli, 1997;
Leavens, Aureli, Hopkins, & Hyatt, 2001; Wagner, Hopper, & Ross, 2016). In their study
of SDB in chimpanzees and gorillas, Wagner et al. (2016) had their subjects participate in
a two-part cognitive task separated by difficulty into easy and hard. Both species
performed better in the easy task than the hard task and, as predicted, SDB rates
increased with the frequency of incorrect responses. Similar results were observed by
Clark and Smith (2013) in their cognitive challenge device. Stress response and SDBs
may not have a simple linear relationship, however, as suggested by a study with a
female orangutan that exhibited lower salivary cortisol after having participated in
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cognitive tasks when compared to baseline cortisol levels when she did not engage in
these tasks (Elder & Menzel, 2001). The lower cortisol levels provided evidence that the
traditional indicators of stress in nonhuman primates may not necessarily be indicative of
a physiological stress response in every instance of SDB expression.
Individual personality traits have a direct relationship with cognitive task
participation and cannot be ignored in considerations of welfare (Herrelko, Vick, &
Buchanan-Smith, 2012; Altschul, Wallace, Sonnweber, Tomonaga, & Weiss, 2017). One
study with 11 chimpanzees demonstrated that the openness personality measure
accounted for 37.2% of the variance in cognitive task participation, and that a
neuroticism personality measure predicted higher rates of SDB (49.5%) (Herrelko et al.,
2012). Other stress-related behaviors that can occur and that are not self-directed can
include aggressive actions directed toward the enrichment itself (Koolhaas et al., 1999).
In terms of the box created for the current study, these aggressive actions can include
excessive repetitive pushing of buttons or attempts to forcefully move the box via
pushing or pulling. Together with SDB, these behaviors can be construed as being stressinduced and are therefore appropriately identified as stress-related behaviors (SRB).
Intraspecies individual variation in performance on cognitive tasks is imperative
when interpreting cognitive ability (Limongelli et al., 1995; Hopper et al., 2014). Both
these studies found that individual chimpanzees varied widely in their adeptness at
completing the tasks successfully. Some chimpanzees in the trap-tube task selected the
correct position from which to remove the food from the trap immediately, while others
either required more trial-and-error attempts or simply chose the wrong strategy and lost
the opportunity to acquire the reward altogether (Limongelli et al., 1995). Hopper et al.
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(2014) delved into the implications of individual variation and its influence on problemsolving success in their assessment of 36 chimpanzees. Those researchers were interested
in the effects of personality, age, sex, and estrous state on rates of success. A factor
analysis of 41 personality traits revealed six dimensions of chimpanzee personality:
methodicalness, extroversion, agreeableness, openness, reactivity/undependability, and
dominance (Hopper et al., 2014).
Each subject performed their task out of view of their conspecifics to eliminate
the possibility of social learning. Two puzzle tasks with different methods of reward
retrieval were used in these experiments. There was intra-individual consistency between
puzzles but no effect of age or sex (Hopper et al., 2014). No significant correlations
between specific aspects of personality were directly connected to success, but significant
positive correlations were found between levels of openness, dominance, and
methodicalness with duration of interaction with the puzzles in the male chimpanzees.
Reactivity/undependability positively correlated with higher latency to engage in the task
in females (Hopper et al., 2014). The researchers mentioned that, for these novel
enrichment/cognitive tasks, individual personalities were less apparent than what would
be observed in a social context.
Touchscreens
Touchscreens have become so pervasive in our culture in recent years that they
have even diffused into the captive environments in which we house animals that are
capable of interacting with them. High profile institutions that utilize such technology
include the Lincoln Park Zoo in Chicago, Zoo Atlanta, and the Primate Research Institute
of Kyoto University (Egelkamp & Ross, 2019; Matsuzawa, 2003; Perdue, Clay, Gaalema,
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Maple, & Stoinski, 2012). This technology offers an intuitive interface for the subjects to
interact with a computer through virtual tasks that offer an array of activities (Fagot &
Maugard, 2013; MacLean et al., 2008; Perdue et al., 2012). Besides direct cognitive
assessments, these types of devices can offer sensory enrichment when programs such as
painting are installed, which has been shown to lower SRB rates (Grunauer &
Walguarnery, 2018).
Implementation of interactive technology as cognitive enrichment has faced
skepticism because it is inherently non-naturalistic and, as such, is not ideal for enriching
a captive environment (Kim-Mccormack, Smith, & Behie, 2016). However, as has been
noted previously, habituation to enrichment is common if not inevitable (Gronqvist et al.,
2013). Hesitation over touchscreen implementation as enrichment may also arise from
methodologies used in some laboratories that isolate individuals and restrain them to
compel participation (Calapai, Berger, Niessing, Heisig, Brockhausen, Treue, & Gail,
2017). The novelty and benefits from engaging with enrichment is typically short-lived
and, therefore, the need for new stimuli is constant and unrelenting. Computerized
interactive technologies offer a unique solution to this issue of novelty, because activities
such as self-expression, visual/audio stimulation, or even social interaction through
monitors operated by zoo guests are limited only by the imagination of the designer
(Clay, Perdue, Gaalema, Dolins, & Bloomsmith, 2011; Kim-Mccormack et al., 2016;
Mallavarapu, Bloomsmith, Kuhar, & Maple, 2013). Even after prolonged access to
computerized enrichment, rhesus monkeys have shown to maintain high levels of
engagement with these types of devices (Bennett et al., 2016). Despite the unnatural
nature of computerized technology as enrichment, Washburn (2015) argues for its
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continued implementation because “Nonhuman primates are flexible. Faced with new
challenges, they learn, adapt, and thrive” (p. 226).
One method by which we can infer whether cognitive experiments improve the
welfare of captive animals is by comparing activity budgets between wild and captive
populations. By establishing a wild population’s activity budget as the baseline for
comparison, we create an ecologically valid frame of reference from which we can
estimate what proportion of behaviors in a captive chimpanzee population is considered
deviant from the norm and indirectly gauge how healthy it is (Yamanashi & Hayashi,
2011). The activity budget of the wild chimpanzees in Yamanashi and Hayashi’s (2011)
study closely matched previous activity budgets for the same population by other
researchers, and the authors noted that chimpanzees in the experimental condition had a
similar resting and feeding activity budget to the wild population. These two activity
budgets differed from the activity budget of the captive control group and provide
evidence that cognitive experiments are effective food-based enrichment if voluntary in
nature (Yamanashi & Hayashi, 2011).
Study Objectives
The purpose of the current study was to test the inductive reasoning ability in
chimpanzees and to assess the efficacy of the task and the experimental box as a means of
enrichment to improve captive welfare. Participants were observed during the task to
collect information on degree of interaction, duration of interaction, and any indications
of stress. Participation of the chimpanzees was analyzed to identify possible predictors
between demographic characteristics of the chimpanzees and box interaction.
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Objective 1.
The first objective was to examine whether chimpanzees demonstrate the ability
to inductively reason via the computerized task presented in the experimental box. I
predicted that the chimpanzees would demonstrate evidence for this ability and that
individuals would vary in their adeptness at the task.
Objective 2.
The next objective was to evaluate whether the rate of usage of the box indicates
that it is an effective form of enrichment for the chimpanzees. Devices of this kind
require a relatively large initial investment, and thus it is valuable to determine if the
value of the box is worth the investment. I predicted that enrichment of this kind is of
value if executed properly.
Objective 3.
Another aim of the current study was to determine if demographic factors such as
age, sex, social group, or placement of the experimental box affected the frequency of
box interaction by the chimpanzees. I predicted that not all individuals would interact
with the box equally and some demographic factors would influence box interaction more
than others.
Objective 4.
The final objective was to determine if potential frustration originating from using
the box outweighs the potential benefits. I predicted that any expressions of stress-related
behaviors associated with frustration from box use would be mild and, therefore, not
preclude the box as a form of effective enrichment.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Ethics Statement
This study was performed with three captive chimpanzee social groups. It was a
non-invasive observational study in which chimpanzee participation was voluntary.
Approval and permission for this study was given by both the Central Washington
University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (protocol #A031801) and the
Project Chimps Science Committee.
Study Site
Project Chimps is a nonprofit sanctuary for retired medical research laboratory
chimpanzees and is funded in large part by the Humane Society of the United States. The
sanctuary has access to 236 acres of forested land in the mountains of Morganton,
Georgia. Founded in 2016, it is the newest chimpanzee sanctuary in the U.S. The
facilities in place were originally constructed by the former Gorilla Haven, a private
wildlife management operation that housed single male gorillas of Zoo Atlanta before the
gorilla species survival plan was amended to house males socially. Gorilla Haven
formally transferred ownership to Project Chimps in 2015. Chimpanzees began to arrive
at the sanctuary in 2016 from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette’s New Iberia
Research Center for medical research.
The space that the chimpanzees occupy is compartmentalized to allow the
separate social groups shared access to the six-acre outdoor Peachtree Habitat enclosure
(hereafter referred to as the habitat) (Appendix A1). The habitat is bisected by an
electrical fence corridor which permits two separate social groups to occupy the habitat at
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any given time. Habitat access is rotated between groups each day. Four villas are
integrated into the 4.5m-tall concrete wall surrounding the habitat. Cantilevered electrical
wire tops the wall and electrical fencing is used to make a secondary barrier around the
villas to create a patio in which caregivers can work while chimpanzees are within the
habitat (Appendix A2). Each villa is composed of two porches and two or three
bedrooms. The porches are large areas outfitted with ample climbing substrate and wire
mesh outer walls to allow exposure to outdoor weather conditions, while the bedrooms
are fully indoor spaces to provide climate-controlled conditions. Two bedrooms are
adjoined by a squeeze cage which is used for chimpanzee transfers and medical
procedures. Chimpanzees gain access to the habitat from the porches through a wire mesh
tunnel that runs through the patio. All doors between chimpanzee-occupied areas are
remotely and electrically operated.
Subjects
The three social groups included in the study comprised a total of 26 individuals
ranging in age from 7 to 27 years old (Appendix B1). Age groups of the chimpanzees
were dichotomized for simplified statistical analysis via generalized linear mixed effects
models. Males 14 years and younger were categorized as non-adults, whereas males 15
years and older were classified as adults; females 12 years and younger were classified as
non-adults, whereas females 13 and older were adults. This age-sex classification follows
Nishida et al. (2003) for the chimpanzees of Mahale. The nine chimpanzees in the
Dorothy Jo & Tilly Villa (DJT) were subadult and juvenile males. Six adult males lived
in the Chimps Ahoy Villa (CA), and nine adult and subadult females lived in Villa Four
(V4). Villas house at maximum two social groups.
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It is not unusual for chimpanzees in medical research laboratories to come from
diverse backgrounds. Some individuals may be wild-caught, some may be relinquished
pets, and some may have only ever lived in laboratory conditions. Explicit life histories
of each individual are not consistently or formally conveyed to Project Chimps but
breeding records do contain information regarding parentage of younger individuals bred
in captivity. Many of the chimpanzees at NIRC and Project Chimps have a filial
relationship with several individuals as a result of captive breeding. The chimpanzees
arrive and live in same-sex social groups until introductions can be made with an
opposite-sex group. At the beginning of the study, the sanctuary had 39 chimpanzees in
six social groups in residence; at the end of the study, six months later, there were 59
individuals in seven groups. One male and one female group became fully integrated over
the course of the study. Group introductions are a major endeavor at Project Chimps,
which aspires to form the largest social groups possible. Captive breeding is not a goal
for Project Chimps and as such measures are taken to prevent the likelihood of
pregnancies. The age of the chimpanzees currently in residence ranges from 7 to 35 years
old.
Boxes
I designed and built by hand two computerized boxes with consultation from
Imperial Woodworking in Thorp, WA. The faces of the boxes had an approximate
surface area of 0.37 ßm2 and were 20 cm deep (Appendix A3a). Only one box was given
to a social group at a time. In the event that competition for box use led to agonistic
behaviors between individuals as evidenced by aggressive behaviors such as threats or
attacks, both boxes would be presented for use. This never became necessary. The boxes
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consisted of nine LED-illuminated interactive buttons corresponding to each combination
of the colors red, yellow, and blue with the shapes circle, triangle, and square. These
buttons were manufactured for classic arcade video game boxes and were purchased from
Arcade World UK (www.arcadeworlduk.com) (Heysham, UK). Button-pressing was the
means by which the chimpanzees responded during trials. The interactive buttons were
randomly arranged in a circle equidistant from each other with an LCD screen in the
center which displayed the color and shape cues presented during each trial. A tenth
white circle LED button was built into the bottom left corner of the box and acted as the
start trial button. The start button was included to measure response latency during the
first trial of a session and to offer each participant the same starting point. Transparent
plexiglass covered all non-interactive surfaces to reduce potential physical damage to the
box as well as to seal the electronic components from liquid damage. Bamboo shoots
were fastened along the front edges of the box to create a gap between the surface of the
box and the mesh upon which it would hang. This was intended to create space for the
chimpanzees to reach buttons in the event that the buttons did not align precisely with the
gaps in the mesh.
The computer running the program was a Raspberry pi 3 microcontroller. This
and other Raspberry pi accessories were purchased from SparkFun electronics
(www.sparkfun.com) (Niwot, USA). The LCD screen was extracted from a pi-topCEED
desktop display and was plugged directly into the Raspberry pi; the display also plugged
into a second printed circuit board (HUB) that regulated power and other functions
(Appendix A4). The HUB was extracted from the pi-topCEED as well. A third circuit
board called a pi-top PROTO was also connected directly to the Raspberry pi 3 and was
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the interface between the pi and buttons. Buttons were wired directly to the pi-top
PROTO. The fourth circuit board held an MCP23017 GPIO expander chip, which was
required to control illumination of the LEDs in the interactive buttons. The fifth printed
circuit board was a stepper motor HAT, which connected to the pi-top PROTO and
interfaced with the STEPPERONLINE stepper motor that turned the gumball mechanism
responsible for dispensing food rewards.
The gumball mechanism was a 10 cm circle cut from 1.2 cm plywood with eight
1.2 cm holes symmetrically cut into the circle which were large enough for only one food
reward pellet. The gumball mechanism was physically connected to the stepper motor
which turned 45° with each correct response so that just one food pellet hole passed over
the slot that led to the food pellet tray where chimpanzees could retrieve the reward. This
allowed for one pellet to be dispensed at a time. A 10-cm poly vinyl chloride plastic tube
cap was used as a container for the food pellets and sat directly above the gumball
mechanism. This allowed the food pellets to be gravity fed into the holes of the gumball
mechanism whenever a pellet had just been dispensed. The food tray was cut from a PVC
tube and was reinforced with metal brackets so that it could not be broken off by the
chimpanzees. Four eyebolts were placed on four corners of the box so that the box could
hang on the mesh from the top and be secured to the mesh by a ratchet strap woven
through the eyes of the bolts across the bottom.
A Raspberry pi V2 camera module was placed just above the LCD screen and
took a photo with each response during trials to assist in identifying which chimpanzees
were engaging with the program. A programmable speaker was placed below the display,
was wired to the pi-top PROTO and set to emit a chime with correct responses. The
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Raspberry pi, stepper motor HAT, and HUB each required their own direct DC power,
thus a power strip was installed in the box. The power strip plugged into an extension
cord that entered the box through a 6-cm hole in the bottom of the box. To prevent the
chimpanzees from being able to grab the extension cord, a removable PVC tube was
fixed to the underside of the box that angled the cord away from the mesh and eliminated
the possibility of a chimpanzee being able to pull the cord toward the mesh.
Trial Programming
A Raspberry pi runs a Linux OS and utilizes the programming language Python. I
drafted the specifications for the “chimp.py” program created to execute the trials and
these specifications were translated into code by a programming freelancer hired through
the Freelancer website (www.freelancer.com). Rounds of trials were defined as an
engagement with the box by a chimpanzee from the pressing of the start button to their
leaving of the box; these engagements could occur multiple times over the hour. Trials
were defined as the individual prompts/responses that occurred within a round. A trial
began when a chimpanzee pressed the illuminated start button, which had a matching
symbol on the display (Appendix A3a). Once a trial began, the cues displayed on the
screen indicated which response buttons were incorrect and would, therefore, not yield a
food reward pellet when pressed. The chimpanzees would then need to inductively reason
that the illuminated button that was not displayed on the screen was the correct answer
and would yield a food pellet. The displayed cues were randomized between each trial. I
supervised all sessions to ensure immediate intervention should the chimpanzees’
wellbeing be compromised through agonism, frustration from use of the boxes, or
electrical threats from damage to wiring in the box. These situations never occurred.
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Upon a correct response by a chimpanzee, a food pellet was dispensed
automatically by the gumball mechanism/stepper motor apparatus into the food tray and
was accompanied by a chime emitted by the speaker. Food pellets were ordered from
Bio-Serv and were a mix of banana, chocolate, berry and piña colada flavors.
Chimpanzees were anticipated to favor one particular flavor over others and, therefore, a
random mix of the pellets would act as variable reinforcement to maintain long-term
interest in participating in the tasks (Hulac, Benson, Nesmith, & Shervey, 2016).
Incorrect responses did not yield a reward and resulted in a new trial with a different set
of cues of the same level of difficulty. Corrective trials occurred when the subject made
two errors consecutively; this was in an effort to offset disinterest or frustration as a result
of a lack of food incentive. In these trials, if the chimpanzees were at an advanced level,
the number of cues on the display would be reduced to a previous level, thus increasing
the likelihood of a successful response. Corrective trials could not occur for consecutive
incorrect responses in the first level (Level 0).
Level 0 constituted the least cognitively demanding task, in that seven of the nine
response buttons were randomly occluded from selection and only one cue was presented
on the display. Response buttons were illuminated and responsive to presses and were,
thus, distinct from the occluded buttons which were neither illuminated nor responsive to
presses. In these trials, subjects had a 50% chance of success and had a higher probability
of comprehending the parameters of success more quickly. Level 1 increased the cue and
response number by one so that two cues were on display and three responses were
available for selection. Additionally, the two incorrect responses in this level shared a
feature, meaning that they were either the same shape or color. This was done to facilitate
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the understanding that the correct response would be dissimilar from the other responses
in some manner.
Participants would progress to each successive level by meeting a set criterion for
their current level (i.e., ³ 80% correct responses over at least 10 consecutive trials). Trial
accuracy and latency of responses were recorded for each trial. During a session, the
Raspberry pi Camera Module V2 captured an image with each response to later
corroborate identity of the chimpanzees to match them to their responses. Every push of a
button that was available as a response was also recorded into a table stored as a .csv file
that included information about the current Level, the date and time, latency to respond,
and whether the response was correct. The original program was later modified to also
include which prompts were on display. Each trial in the first ten hours of box access
began at Level A, but after chimpanzees began to show indications of habituation toward
the box, a modified program was created that started at Level 0. The response buttons in
this modified program would light up intermittently at the start screen in an attempt to
attract the chimpanzees’ attention. Whenever a trial was initiated and one minute had
passed without any activity, the trial terminated and reset to the pre-trial state with the
illuminated start button coupled with the white circle cue on the display. The chimp.py
program originally contained five levels, which increased to seven levels after it was
modified to attempt to offset disinterest.
Level A, similar to Level 1, consisted of three possible responses with two
displayed cues (i.e., 33% chance success), but the two incorrect responses were not
required to be similar in shape or color. Level B increased to five possible responses with
four displayed cues (i.e., 20% chance success). Level C had seven responses available
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with six cues displayed (14% chance success). Level D included all nine responses with
eight cues displayed (i.e., 11% chance success) (Appendix A3b). Because the correct
response in the first four levels was consistently the odd one out, the chimpanzees could
have developed the general strategy that, regardless of the number of responses available
for selection, the correct solution was never displayed on the screen. The use of this
strategy, in which “specific configural ‘patterns’ of multiple stimuli… serve as unique
cues for discriminative responses” (Taniuchi, Miyazaki, & Siddik, 2017, p. 7) was not the
method of interest in this study but is a potential outcome in any cognitive assessment.
The last level, Level E (or the Einstein level) was designed to counterbalance this
general strategy should it have been employed by any of the chimpanzees. Two colors
and two shapes were on the screen and every response button was available for selection.
The two colors were displayed in two columns occupying half the display. The two
shapes were white outlines in the other half of the screen. The chimpanzees that reached
this level had to make broad inferences and exclude any color or shape that matched the
cues. In this way, the chimpanzees could not rely upon their previous strategy to solve the
task, and would have had to relearn how to arrive at a correct response. As an example,
the colors red and blue on display with the shapes triangle and square would have meant
that the only possible solution was the yellow circle. Subsequent levels of difficulty
would become available only if the individual achieved 80% success at the current level;
therefore, chimpanzees that were less skilled at the task were not given trials vastly
beyond their current capacity.
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Experimental Procedure
To become familiar with individual chimpanzees and to establish a baseline of
their behavior, I observed each individual in the three social groups using two-minute
focal scan samples (Altmann, 1974) over a one-hour period using an ethogram adapted
from Neal Webb et al. (2018) (Appendix B2). Each of the 52 behaviors fell into broader
categories: Aggressive, Locomotion, Submissive, Affiliative, Manipulate Object,
Abnormal, Self-Directed, Foraging/Feeding, Inactive, Sexual and Other. The Other
category included three behaviors: pant-hoot, which is not exclusively restricted to any
one behavioral category; out of view, in which case the subject was not observable; and
other, which was any behavior not listed in the ethogram. Recorded behaviors were
supplemented with notes detailing information such as grooming partners in addition to
describing other behaviors. Having a behavioral baseline is important when attempting to
determine whether a new enrichment is effective because it creates a context from which
one can measure whether behavioral frequencies were altered by that enrichment.
Each of the 26 individuals was randomly selected and observed for six hours for a
total of 156 hours of observation between the hours of 11:30 am to 4:30 pm from June 9
to July 27, 2018. Observations were collected with the help of a research assistant, but
IOR could not be established. Observations made by the assistant were dropped, leading
to 134 hours of observation used for final analysis. This yielded unbalanced observations
among individual chimpanzees with some being observed for 3 hours and others for the
full 6 hours. Because these observations were gathered for context and are only presented
via descriptive statistics, the imbalance is regarded as acceptable.
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Presentations of the box occurred anywhere between the hours of 10:30 am and
4:30 pm and were provided for the chimpanzees’ use from September 12 through
December 9, 2018. Each social group was intended to have access to the boxes for 30
hours each. However, with the arrival of two new social groups from NIRC in November,
quarantine procedures came into effect for DJT and V4. The two boxes were kept in these
two villas and CA no longer received access to the box. The three females at DJT (i.e.,
Buttercup, Charisse & Emma) received the box for one hour before they were relocated
to the fourth Cedar Tree Villa for the mixed-sex group formation. CA received the box
for ten hours total and the last session for V4 was canceled because of difficulty shifting
the chimpanzees, resulting in 69 total hours of presentation time.
Selection of social group, position of box, location of set-up, and time of set-up
were pseudo-randomized on testing days and were contingent upon caregivers and their
cleaning schedule as well as their ability to shift chimpanzees out of the area for set-up.
Position of the box refers to whether the box was placed at ground level or an elevated
height so that the chimps could use the box from the second level of their enclosures.
Location of set-up refers to whether the box was placed inside the villa in either a
bedroom or squeeze cage or outside so that it could be used in the porch area. Position
and location were accounted for to determine whether they had an impact on the
likelihood of chimpanzees interacting with a box and were initially designed to be
balanced between conditions across all groups. With the onset of colder weather in
October, plastic sheeting was installed around the mesh surrounding the porches to
provide protection from the cold, and as such, outdoor location placement became
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untenable. Data were still collected on position and location but do not represent a
balanced design between conditions.
A box was hung on the 25-cm2 wire mesh barrier separating chimpanzeeoccupied areas from human areas. A box was placed and removed after chimpanzees
were shifted to another area so that the participants and I could have no physical contact
of any kind. The boxes themselves were suspended by quick links on the human side of
the barrier and were fixed in place by a ratchet strap across the bottom of the box to
fasten it securely to the barrier. Due to the large size of the box, support bars in the mesh
sometimes occluded part of the front surface of the box. The chimp.py program could be
manually adjusted to shift where the cues were displayed on the screen to account for this
occlusion.
When the box was placed at an elevated position, I used a rope and pulley system
to lift the box to the appropriate height. A Campak Xtreme I+ UHD 4K camera was
centered on the box to video record box interactions to corroborate identifications and
behaviors with notes taken during interactions and to measure interaction durations. Once
the box and camera set-up were completed, the chimpanzees were given access to the box
for one-hour intervals. Chimpanzees retained their agency to engage with the box and, as
such, were never isolated or coerced into interacting with the box. Stress-related
behaviors were recorded by all-occurrence sampling during box interactions (Altmann,
1974).
Data Analysis
Data collected during the preliminary behavioral observation phase consisted of
the behavior of each individual, the locations at which the individual was observed during
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the hour, and the time of day. I calculated behavioral frequencies by behavioral category
rather than each behavior for concise data visualization. All behaviors of a category were
summed (X) and then divided by the total number of observations (N = 3660) to
determine their proportion (p̂ ). All other statistical analyses were conducted in R (R Core
Team, 2019). To measure inductive reasoning ability, I used Chi-square analysis on trial
responses of the chimpanzees comparing observed frequencies of correctness to expected
frequencies based on chance. The a priori expected ratio was established at 50% for
Level 0 and 33% for Levels 1 and A based on the number of available response buttons.
Individuals did not progress to any other levels. Only twelve trials of Level 0 and three
trials of Level 1 occurred. Level 1 was reached not by successful completion of Level 0,
but rather as corrective trials for Level A. As a result of the small sample size of these
two levels, they were omitted from analysis. The chimpanzees did not engage with the
box extensively enough to assess individual proficiency and, therefore, all trials in Level
A were pooled and analyzed at the group level.
I analyzed box presentation and demographics of the individual chimpanzees to
determine if these factors predicted whether some individuals were more likely to interact
with the box than others. Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) were created using
the glmer function of the lme4 package with villa (social group) as the random effect.
Response variables in the models were box exploration, box use, and duration of
interaction. Box exploration is defined as attention directed toward the box when an
individual was within 30 cm of the box. This included behaviors such as looking,
touching, smelling, and licking of the box without pushing the start button and beginning
a trial. Box exploration records interest in the box as a physical object. Box use is defined
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as engagement with the program through the initiation of trials and the pushing of active
buttons. Box exploration and use were regarded as binary outcomes, in which no
exploration or use over the hour was designated as a 0 and some degree of interaction
was signified by a 1. Duration of interaction, measured in seconds, is the summation of
time exploring and using the box over the hour for each individual and was not binary in
outcome. The duration GLMM was set to a Poisson distribution in the family argument
of the glmer function, while the box exploration and box use models were set to binomial
distributions.
Linear mixed models were ruled inappropriate for these analyses because box
exploration and box use were binary response variables and interaction duration was
count data. These types of response variables are not well-represented by a simple linear
relationship. Generalized linear models of all predictors and responses were conducted
with social group as another fixed effect, and the correlation coefficients of the fixed
effects of these models were contrasted against the corresponding coefficients. The model
with correlation coefficients closer in value among the estimates was deemed the better
fitting model. The GLMM produced the closest coefficients and was selected in every
case. These types of models are also advantageous in handling repeated measures
coupled with unbalanced sampling (Crofoot, 2013).
The model predicting box exploration was corrected for quasi-complete
separation, a phenomenon in which a response variable occurs exclusively with the same
predictor factor in the data, which the model interprets as perfect prediction. This
phenomenon led to abnormally large estimates and standard errors in the model. For this

56

model, a logistic regression with Firth’s correction was run with the logistf function of
the logistf package. The random effect of villa was retained but run as another factor.
Box exploration and box use by the chimpanzees were distinguishable from each
other by the audible clicks made by button pushing and the .csv files that were only
generated during box use. Interactions in which button pushing occurred but did not yield
a .csv file indicated that chimpanzees pushed inactive buttons and, therefore, these
interactions were not defined as box use. Fixed effect variables of the GLMM included
sex, age class (nonadult or adult), sequence of box presentation (first through thirtieth
presentations), position and location of the box, the program version used, whether the
chimpanzees simultaneously had access to the outdoor habitat, and if quarantine was in
effect. Two GLMM models were created for the box exploration and box use response
variables to identify potential differences between these two levels of box interaction.
Generalized linear mixed models with sequence as a fixed effect and villa as a random
effect were also conducted with box exploration and box use to identify habituation
effects over time.
To determine the value of the box as an enrichment tool, interaction duration and
observed SRB were evaluated by one-tailed t-tests. If one hypothesized that the box is an
ineffective form of enrichment that would not interest the chimpanzees, average use was
not expected to differ significantly from zero. Likewise, the hypothesis that using the box
would not affect the frequency of SRB, these behaviors were also not expected to differ
significantly from zero. Duration of box use and SRB could not be negative integers, and
so I used a one-tailed test with a greater than direction parameter. Camera failure
occurred during two box presentations: during the first presentation for the DJT males
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and the third presentation for the V4 females. Duration could not be corroborated with
behavioral data and, therefore, these values are missing for these two presentations.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Behavioral Observations
Observations of the chimpanzees revealed that the greatest proportion of
behaviors was within the Inactive category (48%, n = 1778), which consisted of two
behaviors: Inactive Alert, where the subject was passive but visibly alert; and Inactive
Rest, where the subject was inactive with eyes closed (see Figure 5). The next highest
proportion of behaviors were in the Foraging/Feeding category, which accounted for 15%
of observations. Affiliative behaviors, such as grooming, represented 8% of observations,
as did behaviors defined as Other. Behaviors in the Locomotion category were 7% of

Figure 1. Proportions of observed behavior. (N = 3660)
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observations, and Abnormal behaviors only represented 5% of observations. Both
categories of Self-Directed and Manipulate were recorded at 4% each. Subjects were
observed to engage in behaviors belonging to the Aggressive (n = 18), Sexual (n = 9),
and Submissive (n = 3) categories, but the frequency of these behaviors did not reach the
threshold of being at least 1% of total observations and, as such, were statistically
represented as occurring at 0% and omitted from graphical display (see Figure 1).
Box Interactions
Over the 69 hours of box presentations, the chimpanzees explored the box 185
times. Of those total explorations, 36 led to box use by 13 chimpanzees (Appendix B3).
One individual, Noel, comprised 16 of the 36 box uses (i.e., 44% of total). During those
36 instances of box use, the chimpanzees completed 186 trials. Instances in which a trial
was initiated by pushing the start button but did not result in an input within one minute
were classified as no response (NR) and were not considered a completed trial.
Chimpanzees initiated but did not complete 25 trials across all three levels. At Level 0,
chimpanzees completed seven trials and left five trials as NR. Only three trials were
completed at Level 1, and at Level A, chimpanzees completed 176 trials while leaving 20
trials as NR. I performed a Chi-square analysis of Level A with chance response
frequencies as 59 correct and 117 incorrect according to the 1:2 odds of guessing the
correct answer. Level A responses were 55 correct and 121 incorrect (c2 = 0.34, df = 1, p
> 0.5) and as such were not significantly different from chance levels (see Figure 2).
Predictors of Box Interaction
The models analyzing factors predicting box exploration, box use, and duration of
interaction produced results of mixed significance. The Firth’s corrected model
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Figure 2. Level A responses: observed and expected outcomes based on chance.
(N = 176)
predicting box exploration did not reveal any significance across any of the factors, but
the GLMM model predicting box use did (see Tables 1 & 2). Male chimpanzees were
predicted to be less likely to use the box (Estimate = -1.258, S.E. = 0.458, z value =
-2.745, p < 0.01) and nonadult chimpanzees were predicted to be more likely to use the
box (Estimate = 1.307, S.E. = 0.629, z value = 2.078, p < 0.05). The placement of the box
in the porch area outside predicted a lower likelihood of box use (Estimate = -1.683, S.E.
= 0.571, z value = -2.947, p < 0.05).
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Table 1
Firth’s Corrected Logistic Regression Model of All Predictors and Box Exploration
Fixed Effect

Coefficient

S.E.

Chisq

p

-1.365

2.558

0.235

0.627

Nonadults

1.767

1.550

0.671

0.412

Sequence

-0.070

0.107

0.202

0.652

Up Position

1.009

1.072

0.445

0.504

Outside Location

1.360

1.223

0.798

0.371

Quarantine

0.893

1.504

0.225

0.634

Habitat Access

0.212

1.176

0.016

0.897

-1.258

1.661

0.219

0.639

p

Males

Original Program

Table 2
GLMM of All Predictors and Box Use
Fixed Effect
Estimate

S.E.

z value

Males

-1.258

0.458

-2.745

0.006 **

Nonadults

1.307

0.629

2.078

0.037 *

Sequence

-0.028

0.049

-0.589

0.556

0.105

0.464

0.226

0.821

Outside Location

-1.683

0.571

-2.947

0.003 **

Quarantine

-1.184

0.733

-1.614

0.106

Habitat Access

-0.831

0.512

-1.623

0.104

0.631

0.691

0.914

0.360

Up Position

Original Program
Notes. * p < 0.5. **p < 0.01.

The model examining box interaction duration was significant for each fixed
effect predictor (see Table 3). Box presentation sequence had a negative relationship with
duration (Estimate = -0.10, S.E. = 0.003, z value = -32.81, p < 0.001). Chimpanzee sex
also had a negative relationship for the male sex (Estimate = -2.238, S.E. = 0.059, z value
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= -37.52, p < 0.001). Location of box placement was negative for outside placement
(Estimate = -0.21, S.E. = 0.02, z value = -8.15, p < 0.001). Having access to the Peachtree
habitat led to a negative relationship with duration of use (Estimate = -0.82, S.E. = 0.02, z
value = -29.36, p < 0.001). The original program was negatively associated with duration
(Estimate = -0.08, S.E. = 0.03, z value = -2.13, p < 0.05). Age class showed a positive
relationship for the Nonadults class (Estimate = 0.87, S.E. = 0.04, z value = 20.64, p <
0.001). Box positioning at the upper level had a positive relation with duration (Estimate
= 0.15, S.E. = 0.02, z value = 6.61, p < 0.001). Duration had a positive relationship with
quarantine procedures (Estimate = 0.49, S.E. = 0.04, z value = 12.16, p < 0.001).
Table 3
GLMM of All Predictors and Duration
Fixed Effect
Estimate

S.E.

z value

p

Males

-2.238

0.059

-37.521

<0.0001 ***

Nonadults

0.876

0.042

20.644

<0.0001 ***

Sequence

-0.101

0.003

-32.817

<0.0001 ***

Up Position

0.157

0.023

6.619

<0.0001 ***

Outside Location

-0.211

0.025

-8.153

<0.0001 ***

Quarantine

0.496

0.040

12.169

<0.0001 ***

Habitat Access

-0.825

0.028

-29.364

<0.0001 ***

Original Program

-0.083

0.039

-2.139

0.0324 *

Notes. * p < 0.5. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001.
The two GLMMs with box exploration and box use as the response variables and
sequence as the sole predictor did not reveal significance for box use, but did reveal a
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significant negative relationship for box exploration (Estimate = -0.135, S.E. = 0.039, z
value = -3.431, p < 0.001) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Exploration and use rates by sequence with mixed effect regression.
Stress Indicators and Enrichment Value
Behavioral data collected to assess possible stress induced by box interaction
yielded 48 separate observations of SRB, with aggressive actions directed toward the box
being the most frequently observed behavior (85%, n = 41) (Appendix B3). The other
seven observations were of self-scratching during box interaction. One individual, Noel,
accounted for 54% of total observed SRB. The results of the one-sample t-test of SRBs
were significantly different than the expected mean of 0, t (194) = 4.04, p < 0.0001.
Interaction duration as an indicator of enrichment value yielded results that were also
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significantly different from an anticipated mean of 0, t (191) = 6.65, p < 0.0001.
(Appendix B4; DJT Females durations are from 1 hr of use only). Noel also interacted
with the box for longer than any other chimpanzee, at 3,522 s (28%) of the total 12,234 s
of all interaction time (Appendix B3).
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Behavioral Observations
The behavioral observations I recorded should not be considered a comprehensive
representation of the overall daily activity budget of the chimpanzees because of the
narrow range during the day that they were collected. The chimpanzees were only
observed between 11:30 am and 4:30 pm, which makes these observations susceptible to
sampling bias (Altmann, 1974). However, this limitation was unavoidable, as this time
range represented when caregivers could offer me access to areas to observe the focal
chimpanzees. As an example of the potential skew of the data, aggressive behaviors did
not account for even 1% of observed behaviors, but mornings in the villas were marked
by high levels of excitement in the chimpanzees as they awaited their first meal, which is
hand-served to each individual and, therefore, time-consuming to distribute. Prolonged
excitement over the anticipation of meals sometimes led to displaying behavior and
agonistic interactions between individuals, which was not reflected in my observations
collected in the afternoon. In addition, behavioral observations began immediately before
or after lunch was served as scattered forage, which may explain why the
Feeding/Foraging category contained the second highest proportion of observed
behaviors (15%); chimpanzees would spend a fair amount of time seeking out the
individual pieces of scattered food around the villa. Lunch served as forage meant that
the chimpanzees did not have to wait to obtain food and, as such, there was less
excitement that culminated in agonistic interactions.
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The high rate of inactivity observed (48%) may also be biased by the time of day
during sampling. With the departure of the caregivers after providing lunch and afternoon
enrichment, the chimpanzees were at liberty to occupy their afternoon however they
chose, which I observed to be generally inactive. Bloomsmith and Lambeth (1995)
observed high levels of inactivity between the meals of chimpanzees that were on
predictable feeding schedules, which is consistent with the behavioral data I recorded for
the afternoons. This inactivity is in stark contrast to the pre-meal excitement of breakfast
and dinner, which is a common occurrence and known as food anticipatory behavior
(Mistlberger, 1994). During behavioral observations and box presentations, I could
confirm the arrival of the caregivers for dinner not only by the sound of their approaching
vehicle but also by the directed alertness of the chimpanzees toward the approaching
vehicle. The arrival of the vehicle could therefore have served as an unreliable signal of
feeding events, which may have increased frustration and agonism when meals were not
served promptly at arrival (Gottlieb, Coleman, & McCowan, 2013).
Another drawback of this sampling method was its bias for state behaviors over
event behaviors. Behaviors included in the aggressive, affiliative, sexual, and abnormal
categories are often rather brief, and 2-minute interval focal samples are not effective at
capturing these quick moments well (Altmann, 1974). This explains the relatively low
frequencies of the other behavioral categories outside of inactive and feeding/foraging
categories. These two categories encompass behaviors that frequently last several
minutes. The rate of abnormal behaviors is worth discussing as well, as the
contentiousness of what behaviors can be considered abnormal means that the 5%
frequency at which abnormal behaviors were observed could be interpreted as an inflated

67

number if one eliminates some activities, such as coprophagy, from being labeled as
abnormal (Hopper et al., 2016). Even at this inflated rate, the proportion of abnormal
behavior is not as prevalent as frequencies observed in other populations (Birkett &
Newton-Fisher, 2011). Despite the potential for a skewed representation of the activity
budgets of the study subjects, this sampling method was beneficial in demonstrating that
the chimpanzees were fairly inactive during the afternoon between lunch and dinner, thus
indicating that the provision of stimulating enrichment during this time frame was
appropriate.
Task Proficiency
Despite the numerous opportunities to interact with the box, the chimpanzees as a
group did not perform above chance in the trials that they did complete. There are many
explanations for this lack of success. First and foremost, as a voluntary task with no prior
training on how to use the box’s program, the chimpanzees’ success was contingent upon
not only their intelligence but also their curiosity and persistence (Litman, 2005). An
individual would have needed to be sufficiently motivated to explore the box to the point
that they discovered that the start button would initiate a trial. The individual would then
need to continue their investigation by selecting a lit button rather than an unlit one. Next,
the chimpanzees would have to stumble upon the correct response to the trial
accidentally. This cycle of events would then need to be repeated many times for the
chimpanzees to have the opportunity to discover the pattern of oddity equaling success.
With all these steps acting as barriers impeding quick task comprehension, it is
unsurprising that the chimpanzees as a whole were unable to respond above chance.

68

It is also important to mention that because only lit buttons were recorded as
responses during a trial, there is the possibility that success rates were inflated as a
consequence. Chimpanzees were sometimes observed to push buttons regardless of
whether they were lit or not during a trial, and as was stated in the Methods section, unlit
buttons were not responsive to button pushes and could not be recorded as incorrect
inputs even though they technically were. The chimpanzees that initiated trials were
sometimes observed to select buttons in both a clockwise and counterclockwise fashion
by pushing adjacent buttons one after the other. This was not the case for each individual
every time they used the box, but it occurred at least once among three individuals (AY,
BC, HR). Some chimpanzees were also observed attempting to interact with the cues
directly on the LCD screen (OC). These attempts imply that the box would have been
more effective and intuitive had the screen and task been an actual touchscreen rather
than button-dependent. The connection between the buttons and the cues on the screen
may in fact have been counterintuitive and confusing for the participants and a major
obstacle to interacting with the box. The matching of the white circle button to the white
cue on display may have also added to the incomprehensibility of the task, in that it was
in opposition to what the task was actually testing (i.e., nonmatching). Should these
issues be the case, then the overall box design is flawed and should be reevaluated to
improve intuitive use.
The number of completed trials (176) is a relatively low rate of box usage given
the number of opportunities the chimpanzees had access to the box. This study was
distinct from others involving interactive technology in that the chimpanzees did not
receive any training on how to engage with the program, which is typical in other
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touchscreen studies (Herrelko et al., 2012; Calapai et al., 2017). As a visiting researcher, I
did not have the opportunity or time to interact with the chimpanzees to the degree that
would allow for training on box use. With the limited data set collected, it would be
inadvisable to draw conclusions about the cognitive ability of chimpanzees in terms of
inductive reasoning from these results.
Predictors of Box Interaction
The interaction frequencies for box exploration was higher at the beginning of the
study as opposed to the end, but box use was low and consistently so. The chimpanzees’
dwindling interest in the box suggests that they became habituated to its presence over
time as its novelty waned (Murphy, McSweeney, Smith, & McComas, 2003). Efforts to
rekindle interest in the box were made with program modifications to make the box more
visually stimulating with the intermittently lit buttons and the addition of the simpler
levels. Even with these changes, the chimpanzees’ interest was not high enough to incite
interaction with the box. In addition, box presentations for a villa were often intermittent,
in that several days could go by before the chimpanzees would be given access to the box
again, which is believed to bolster interest in enrichment (Murphy, McSweeney, Smith,
& McComas, 2003) but did not appear to make a difference in this specific instance.
Sex was surprisingly significant in terms of predicting box usage. Males and
females did not differ in their exploratory behaviors of the box, but males were less likely
to use the box. This female bias echoes the discoveries made of wild chimpanzees and
tool use for extractive foraging (Gruber, Clay, & Zuberbühler, 2010; McGrew, 1979;
Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007). The tools used in termite-fishing and ant-dipping by the
chimpanzees at Gombe were shown to be significantly higher among females than males,
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as evidenced by their longer extraction durations and higher insect content in their feces
compared to males (McGrew, 1979). At Fongoli, chimpanzee spear-hunting of
bushbabies as they sleep in tree hollows has shown to be a heavily female-centric activity
and entails the precise processing of tree branches in order for them to function as
adequate spears (Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007). In a sense, the box represents a kind of
extractive foraging, which appears to be a preferred method of food acquisition for
female chimpanzees both in the wild and in captivity.
Nonadult chimpanzees were predicted to be more likely to use the box. This may
have been the result of a greater degree of curiosity and novelty-seeking in younger
individuals, but no literature has found consistent age-related differences in neophilia
(Kendal, Coe, & Laland, 2005). This nonadult positive relationship is likely the result of
skew caused by one nonadult individual, Noel, who accounted for almost half of all box
uses in conjunction with the low engagement of the Chimps Ahoy adult males. In
addition, chimpanzees were predicted to be less likely to use the box when it was placed
outdoors in the porch areas, but these results should be accepted tentatively because of
the imbalance of box location presentations that occurred due to the onset of the winter
season. This negative relationship could be the result of the correlation between the
earlier sequence in which box presentations occurred in the outdoor location and may
have skewed the results in that direction.
The model for duration showed significance for each predictor. The nonadult age
class, elevated position, and quarantine predictors were positively correlated with
duration, whereas sequence, the male sex, outside location, access to the habitat, and
original program were associated with decreases in interaction duration. The estimates of
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the significant results from the box exploration GLMM are consistent with the estimates
of the corresponding fixed effects in the duration of interaction GLMM (i.e., nonadults
use the box more often/longer, males use the box less often/more briefly, and placing the
box in the porch area makes the chimps less likely to use the box for long durations).
The behavioral data results suggest that the time of day that the boxes were
presented may have been a key influence on box interaction rates as well. Because box
presentations always followed the serving of lunch and afternoon enrichment, the
chimpanzees may have been less motivated to seek out food when their preferred activity
during this time was to be inactive or resting (Mistlberger, 1994; Bloomsmith &
Lambeth,1995). Food served at lunch and as enrichment were much more readily
accessible than the food pellets dispensed by the box. To compound the motivation
problem, the food pellets themselves may not have been an enticing enough reward for
the chimpanzees. Several chimpanzees were observed to drop their reward pellet
immediately after tasting it, most notably Noel, who would actively throw the pellets
through the mesh during the third box presentation at V4. Other chimpanzees were
observed to consume these discarded rewards instead of the chimpanzee who had earned
them.
Stress-Related Behaviors
The level of SRB observed indicates that the task was too challenging for the
chimpanzees, which led to frustration and the subsequent self-directed behaviors and
aggressions enacted toward the box. These rates of SRB and frustration may have also
affected the rates of box interaction by outweighing the low motivation and value of the
rewards. Noel expressed the most behaviors defined as SRB during her engagement with

72

the box, and so we must decide whether its benefits in the form of increased activity is of
greater value than the potential frustration it elicits (Meehan & Mench, 2007; Bennet et
al., 2014; Dutton et al., 2018). Most of the aggressions consisted of attempts to pull or
push the box from the mesh rather than hit it specifically and often occurred before use of
the program. One interpretation of this may be that because the chimpanzees have never
encountered this kind of enrichment before, and because a large part of their current
enrichment entails some degree of destruction to acquire food rewards, that they believed
the box was yet another form of enrichment that necessitated deconstruction to acquire
the rewards.
In regard to Noel who accounted for over half of the observed SRB, it is
important to establish context and know that she has a unique tendency toward
destructive behaviors of many objects to which she is given access. This is exemplified
by her removal of the plastic flaps covering the shifting doors separating the porches
from the bedroom areas, and prying off of the plywood sheets used to create a barrier in
the mesh between bedrooms when the new male group arrived in November. These
behaviors might suggest that Noel is acting out of compromised welfare, but given her
high degree of sociality and playfulness with chimpanzees and humans alike, this would
be an unlikely assumption. Rather than conclude that Noel behaved aggressively toward
the box as a result of frustration, her caregivers were more inclined to propose that her
preferred enrichment is the exploration of the internal composition of objects; a testament
to her inquisitive nature (Damerius et al., 2017). Another plausible explanation for her
behavior could be neophobia, which is supported by her behavior during the first box
presentation at V4 when she directed mild displaying behavior in the form of gentle
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swaying near the box after it emitted a chime for the first time. Previous studies have
suggested that chimpanzees are the most cautious large-bodied ape when presented with
novel food (Gustafsson, et al., 2014), and similar reluctance may have been experienced
by the chimpanzees in this study.
Noel interacted with the box for the longest duration and was observed to perform
a self-directed behavior only once during all her interactions, which may further the
interpretation that her aggressive behaviors toward the box were not necessarily
indicative of physiological arousal and stress-related behavior (Wagner, et al., 2016).
Taking into account the unique dispositions of each individual is critical for a holistic
interpretation of these results (Herrelko et al., 2012; Hopper et al., 2014). Because we are
unable to ascertain the underlying motivations of the chimpanzees’ actions, we must by
default err on the side of caution and regard her aggression as an indicator of stress.
Although tasks such as these may elicit indicators of stress in the animals that participate
in them, it is important to recall that arguments can be made for some degree of stress
being beneficial to overall welfare because it replicates the conditions these animals
would experience in the wild (Meehan & Mench, 2007).
Enrichment Value
The duration of box interactions was significantly different than what the null
hypothesis would predict (Appendix B4). The chimpanzees clearly expressed interest in
the box, especially during the earlier presentations (see Figure 3). Between the significant
results indicative of stress and the significant results of duration of use as enrichment
value, it may seem difficult to decide whether the box’s value as enrichment outweighs
the stress it causes. Because both t-tests were similar in their degree of significance, we
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can look to the t value itself to aid our decision. For stress, the test yielded a t value equal
to 4.04, whereas in the test for enrichment the t value was 6.65. Based on the magnitude
of these numbers, the enrichment value of the box as measured by the duration of
interactions is greater than the stress elicited by those interactions. Similar to Herrelko et
al. (2012), repeated interest and engagement with the box suggests that the box was in
fact enriching, although it may be more accurate to say that the box’s novelty was the
root cause of interest and enrichment. Dwindling interest does not necessarily indicate
that the box was an inadequate form of enrichment, but rather that refinement of the box
and how it is presented is required if we are to consider future box presentations with
these chimpanzees. An alternative explanation for low box interaction may be that the
chimpanzees were sufficiently stimulated by their ordinary day-to-day routine, such that
the addition of the box was superfluous to their already enriched environment; meaning
to say, Project Chimps fulfills its mission statement to provide exemplary care to the
chimpanzees.
Future Directions
This study was designed by a novice to cognitive studies, and the experience
generated many ideas to attempt the same study with better, more effective strategies.
Some of the chimpanzees were inclined to directly touch the screen rather than the
buttons, thus demonstrating that the use of touchscreens may be a critical element
because they are more intuitive to use. The size of the box also proved to be unwieldy to
attach to the mesh, but was necessary to accommodate both the larger screen and the
buttons. Replacing both these components with a touchscreen would therefore reduce the
size of the box and streamline its setup. Better food rewards would also be advantageous;
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nuts and dried fruits are popular with the chimpanzees at Project Chimps and would have
served well as incentive to participate in the task. This type of reward was precluded by
the design of the gumball mechanism which was simple in its construction but ineffective
at dispensing objects that were not spherical in shape. An alternative mechanism that can
accommodate irregularly shaped items may make a significant difference.
Another redesign of the box that could have improved the study is screen sharing,
which would allow the observer to see the display on the box as the chimpanzees saw it.
The manner in which the box was hung on the mesh made viewing the display impossible
in certain areas of the villa, so that the observer could not see what the cues on the screen
were until reviewing the transcripts of the trials later. Such a feature necessitates strong
Bluetooth and WiFi connections however, which was unavailable in the villas during the
study. An alternative to remote screen sharing is integration of a second screen into the
box itself on the opposite side of the one the chimpanzees have access to. This method
would be straightforward to accomplish, and would not require a second touchscreen.
Inclusion of software to record individual progress to tailor trial difficulty to that
individual based on their level of success would also be a worthwhile addition, but was
unnecessary for this study because no individual was able to progress past the first level.
For future devices that are more engaging, an individual tailoring feature will be both
essential and invaluable.
Training of individuals for box use may have been the catalyst necessary to
facilitate chimpanzee success, but these practices may muddle results in that the subjects
are not self-discovering solutions and are rather following a learned routine. Instead of
classical operant conditioning training, designing simple tasks to precede cognitive tasks
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may act as an effective reinforcer for promoting interaction, especially when the device
with which the individuals interact is first introduced. Once individuals demonstrate
active participation, the cognitive task of interest can then be integrated into the device.
Additionally, as a visiting researcher, I had neither the authority nor the time to commit
to training the potential subjects. This study may have yielded different results if
executed by an individual who is allowed greater interaction with the chimpanzees.
Many cognitive studies approach assessments of cognition from only one angle
by testing for a single cognitive ability, as in this study. Creating a computerized
enrichment device that can offer an array of tasks and activities would be a more
effective and productive method of cognitive assessment and enrichment by adding
agency to which tasks a captive animal can participate in. Cognitive studies and captive
enrichment need not be mutually exclusive; all that is required to join these two pursuits
is imagination and creativity.
Conclusions
No evidence was discovered to suggest that the chimpanzees could reason
inductively. However, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Little data were
gathered from which we could investigate this ability. Future, more robust studies may
yet demonstrate this ability. This study did reveal a decrease in interaction over time
consistent with habituation and a negative tendency for males to use the program, which
echoes their lack of engagement in extractive foraging in the wild. Nonadults were also
found to be more likely to engage with the box. The lengths of duration that the
chimpanzees interacted with the box supports its provision as enrichment and, although it
may have incited some SRBs, there is reason to believe that the stress rates are inflated
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because of one subject’s propensity toward destructive behavior and that the enrichment
value outweighs the stress regardless. The negative results in the cognitive aspect of
analysis may discourage attempts at future investigations, but in the words of de Waal
(2010, p. 303) “negative experimental outcomes have more often than not been followed
by positive ones after modification of the experimental design.”
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
PHOTOS OF SANCTUARY AND BOXES

A1. Layout of habitat facilities at Project Chimps. Source: projectchimps.org

A2. Porch enclosures of the chimpanzee villas (without patio fencing).
Source: projectchimp.org
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A3. The display cues before a trial (a, left) and during Level D (b, right).

A4. Internal components of a box.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURE
B1
Demographics of Study Population
Individual

ID

Villa

Sex

Age

Buttercup
Charisse
Emma
Binah
Danner
Hercules
Jacob
Kennedy
Kivuli
Leo
Oscar
Ray
Arthur
Josh
Marlon
Patrick
Quintin
Taz
Almasi
Amy
Babs
Harley
LB
Loretta
Noel
Sarah
Sky

BC
CS
EM
BI
DR
HC
JC
KD
KU
LE
OC
RY
AU
JH
MR
PT
QU
TZ
AL
AY
BB
HR
LB
LO
NO
SR
SY

DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
DJT
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
V4
V4
V4
V4
V4
V4
V4
V4
V4

F
F
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F

13
13
13
10
8
11
7
10
7
11
7
9
16
27
17
16
16
22
11
9
22
9
21
9
11
9
21
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Behavioral
Observations
6
6
0
5
6
6
5
5
1
6
6
4
5
3
6
6
3
6
6
4
5
6
5
6
4
6
4

B2
Ethogram of Behaviors
Category
Code
Aggressive

Locomotion

Behavior

Description

AL

Agitated
locomotion

Brisk, or rapid walking that often
occurs with increased vigilance
toward event, animal, or object.

HA

Hit away

Source of apprehension or tension
(another animal or object) is hit
towards. If this occurs with screaming
or fear grimace, will be recorded as
such using modifiers.

DS

Display

TH

Threat

Aggressive behavior without any
clear and identifiable recipient. May
include pilo-erection, and such
behaviors as beating on or moving
inanimate objects, stomping, slapping,
swaying, hooting, chest-beat, or
running.
Includes arm raising, arm waving,
wrist shaking, lunging toward, and
chasing toward another animal. No
physical contact is made.

CA

Contact
aggression

Aggressive behavior that involves
physical contact between individuals.
Includes, wrestling, lunge hit, grab,
bite, and scratch.

HN

Hang

All of the animal's weight is
supported by wire of walls (i.e.
animal is grasping wire with hands
and feet), or the animal is hanging
beneath the climbing bars.

WK

Walk

Moving through space at a calm,
steady pace on horizontal surface
(may be on ground, stairs, or
platform). If walking occurs with play
face, then it is considered play.
Includes walking with food.
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Submissive

CL

Climb

Individual is climbing from one point
to another in normal location (e.g.
onto a platform, from top of cage, to
side of cage, etc.). If this occurs with
play face, then it is considered play.
Includes climbing with food.

BC

Brachiate

Animal uses arms to swing from one
location to another. If this occurs with
play face, then it is considered play.
Includes brachiating with food.

FL

Flee

Moving away from another at full
speed. If fleeing occurs with
screaming or fear grimace, will be
recorded as such using modifiers.

AV

Avoid

Moving away as another approaches
or moves out of the path of another.
Also includes flinching, or slight
ducking of the head, or head and
shoulders, or momentary retreat
movements. If this occurs with a fear
grimace or scream, will be recorded
as such using modifiers.

FG

Fear-grimace

Facial expression with parted lips that
are pulled back, exposing the teeth
which are closed. Includes bared-teeth
scream, a facial expression with
parted lips that are pulled back
exposing the teeth accompanied by
high pitched screaming.

PT

Present

Posture may vary from extreme
crouch (i.e. all four limbs are folded
under such that animal is close to the
ground) to smaller degrees of limb
flexion. Subordinate may also turn
rump towards the other without any
flexion of the limbs. If this occurs
with screaming, fear grimace, or pantgrunt, will be recorded as such using
modifiers.

103

Affiliative

RC

Receive contact
aggression

Receiving any contact aggression
behaviors.

RA

Receive noncontact
aggression

Receiving any aggression behaviors
not defined as contact aggression.

TT

Temper tantrum Screaming loudly, may include
leaping up, flinging arms above head
and slapping them onto the ground,
hurling self to the ground on face,
hugging the cage mesh, an object or
tumbling over and over, still
screaming. Screaming may end in
glottal cramps (gagging sounds).

GM

Groom mutual

Focal animal picking through hair or
at skin removing debris w/ hands or
mouth (not pulling) on another chimp
who is concurrently grooming the
focal animal.

GG

Groom given

Focal animal picking through hair or
at skin removing debris w/ hands or
mouth (not pulling) on another
animal.

GR

Groom received Another animal picking through hair
or at skin removing debris w/ hands
or mouth (not pulling) on the focal
animal.

EM

Embrace

HI

Human
interaction
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Ventro-ventral contact when two
individuals face each other and each
puts both arms around the other or
contact with both arms of an
individual encompassing another
from behind.
Non-aggressive behavior directed
toward human when human is not
directly interacting with chimp.
Includes attempts to play with human,
attempts to gain human attention (e.g.
cage bangs), and attempts to give
human inanimate object (e.g. twigs,
wads, grass, etc.).

PY

Play

PS

Play-self

OA

Other affiliative Focal animal engaged in any
affiliative behavior not described
elsewhere. May include kissing, or
hand to mouth contact.

Manipulate
NS
Object/Species typical

Non-aggressive interactions involving
two or more animals. Never
accompanied by pilo-erection or
agonism; may be accompanied by
play-face and/or laughing. Includes
rough-and-tumble play (fast-paced,
vigorous locomotion, wrestling,
hitting, pulling, chasing, biting, etc.),
quiet play (slower-paced, gentletickling, finger and toe manipulation,
etc.). May involve the use of an
object.
Individual may play quietly by itself
with hands, fingers and toes, other
body parts, including genitals, or an
object may be handled and be the
focus of play.

Nest

Use of paper or other material to
create a nest. May include smoothing
material on the floor, tearing material
and placing on the floor, carrying
material or paper to another location.

TU

Tool use

Includes creating and using sticks for
fishing or to obtain an out-of-reach
object, and using any other object or
material for something other than that
which it was intended.

EO

Explore object

Sensory investigation of an object.
Includes handling, touching, moving,
smelling, mouthing, listening to, or
tasting objects, including part of the
caging structure (mesh, bolt, wood
structure).

UE

Use enrichment

Any visual, olfactory, manual, or oral
use of enrichment devices, including
mirrors, pipe feeders, forage boards,
toys, and other enrichment objects.
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Abnormal

Self-directed

RR

Regurgitation/
reingestion

Deliberate regurgitation and
consumption of previously ingested
food.

CY

Coprophagy

Deliberate ingestion of own or other
animal's feces.

FS

Feces smear

Smearing or spreading feces on a
surface with hands or mouth.

HP

Hair pluck

Pulling out own or other's hair from
the root in a quick motion, followed
by manipulation of the root. Excludes
self-grooming.

IB

Idiosyncratic
body
manipulation

Repeated, sustained and purposeless
manipulation of a specific area of own
body, such as eye-poking, selfpatting, or ear-covering.

IM

Idiosyncratic
movement

Repeated movement of body in
purposeless manner, including neck
twisting, swaying back and forth,
head rolling, pacing, and rocking.

UP

Urophagy

Ingestion of own or other animals’
urine.

OB
SG

Other
abnormal
Self-groom

Any abnormal behavior not described
above.
Picking through own hair or at skin
removing debris w/ hands or mouth
(not pulling). Includes visual attention
directed at body part for inspection of
potential grooming site.

GS

Gentle scratch

Raking one's own hair or skin with
fingernails, including mainly
movements of hand and fingers. A
new instance is scored after a period
of 5 seconds of no scratching.

RS

Rough scratch

Rake one's own hair or skin with
fingernails, including large
movements of arm. A new instance is
scored after a period of 5 seconds of
no scratching.
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Foraging/
Feeding

Inactive

Other

Sexual

FR

Foraging

Manipulating the substrate or food
item while intermittently transferring
items to the mouth or chewing a food
item. Not stationary. Does not include
chewing wads of food for long
periods of time.

ED

Eating/drinking

Consuming food items, including
chow, or drinking water while
remaining stationary in sitting
position. Does not include chewing on
wads of food for long periods of time.

IR

Inactive rest

Animal is immobile, not engaging in
activity, is generally relaxed, and is
lying down, leaning, or reclining.

IA

Inactive alert

Individual is in a sitting, prone, or
quadrupedal position, is not
exhibiting signs of sleepiness, and is
not involved in any active behavior
such as locomotion, play, eating,
rocking, or grooming. Individual is
alert and attention is directed toward
people, chimps, inanimate object, or
nearby event.

PH

Pant hoot

Occurs by itself in the context of
excitement. Voiced on both inhalation
and exhalation and incorporates a
series of "hoo" sounds which may or
may not escalate to an "ahh"
vocalization.

OV

Out of view

Not visible by observer.

OO

Other

Any behavior that is not included in
this ethogram.

CP

Copulate

Ventral surface of initiator is in
contact with dorsal surface of another
animal. Pelvic thrusting is exhibited.
May occur with or without
penetration.
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ST

Solicit

Animal (generally male) sits facing
another individual with thighs rotated
laterally. Male often has an erection
and may exhibit thrusting motions.

MT

Mount

Ventral surface of initiator is in
contact with dorsal surface of another
animal with proper orientation. If
thrusting occurs, will be scored as
copulate. If occurs with play face, will
be scored as social play.

GE

Genital explore

Visual, oral, or manual inspection of
ano-genital region. May be other- or
self-directed. Does not include selfgrooming of the ano-genital region,
manipulation of the anus to obtain
feces, or masturbation.

MB

Masturbate

Using a body part, an object or a part
of the cage to stimulate the subject’s
own genitals.

Notes. Ethogram of behaviors adapted from “Captive chimpanzee behavior as a function of
space per animal and enclosure type” (Neal Webb, Hau, & Schapiro, 2018) with some
definitions taken from Hopper, Freeman and Ross (2016), and AZA Ape Taxon Advisory
Group & AZA Animal Welfare Committee (2010).
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B3
Total Box Interactions and Stress-Related Behaviors
ID
Explorations
Uses
Duration
SRB
BC
1
1
551
1
CS
1
0
149
1
EM
1
1
729
1
BI
11
1
199
1
DR
3
0
113
0
HC
10
1
563
1
JC
2
0
64
2
KD
8
1
261
3
KU
10
3
814
3
LE
21
2
1349
1
OC
7
1
152
2
RY
5
0
57
0
AU
2
0
33
0
JH
4
0
114
0
MR
3
0
56
0
PT
3
0
108
0
QU
3
2
107
0
TZ
1
0
28
0
AL
10
0
478
1
AY
12
3
834
1
BB
6
0
354
0
HR
9
1
291
1
LB
6
0
328
1
LO
8
3
612
0
NO
20
16
3522
27
SR
15
0
357
1
SY
3
0
11
0
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Aggressions
1
1
1
1
0
0
2
1
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
26
1
0

SDB
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

B4. Mean durations of box use by sex and villa.
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